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1. Introduction 
Since several decennia companies have progressively engaged in voluntary social and environmental reporting, 
disclosing their vision, intentions, practices, efforts and accomplishments with respect to aspects of sustainability. 
According to the most recent KPMG survey of corporate responsibility (CR) reporting, "Currents of Change" 
(KPMG, 2015), 95% of the Global Fortune 250 companies and 73% of the largest 100 companies in each country 
surveyed engage in CR reporting. However, the growth rate in CR reporting seems to be slowing down. The 
report states the main driver for CR disclosure to be legislative: "a growing trend of regulations requiring 
companies to publish non-financial information". However, regulation requires clear directives to enable 
assessment and enforcement of compliance. And although international guidelines are being developed, this is 
still a work in progress, the results are far from being generally and globally accepted and applied. A 
comprehensive overview of the developments in CR standards is provided by Tschopp and Nastanski (2014), 
comparing these developments with the history of financial reporting and standardization. The GRI's current "G4 
sustainability guidelines" standard (Global Reporting Initiative [GRI], 2013) appears to be the globally most 
generally accepted and applied standard for corporate responsibility guidance and reporting (Tschopp & 
Nastanski, 2014). Such an international standard would be necessary to substantiate legislative requirements in a 
world of globalizing business and companies. 
Through recent years, the Netherlands have shown to be struggling with environmental sustainability 
performance. In December 2012 Dutch newspapers reported that the Netherlands, in spite of its own national 
perception of being a leading country in sustainability, had shown the worst climate policy performance of all EU 
countries (De Volkskrant, December 7
th
, 2012). Moreover, in 2016, the Netherlands appeared second last in the 
European sustainability ranking (De Volkskrant, March 31
st
, 2016), revealing little progress with respect to 
national sustainability performance. In view of the recently in Paris accomplished EU agreement regarding 
climate change, a universal, legally binding global climate deal (European Commission [EC], 2015), the Dutch 
government might be expected to feel an urgency to advance extensive measures in an attempt to catch up with 
their sustainability objectives and performance. In this setting, companies in the Netherlands may expect to be 
subject to closer scrutiny by the Dutch government in the years to come. Possible measures could include 
regulation and legislation of environmental sustainability reporting. While in the Netherlands CR reporting 
currently is not (yet) mandatory, Dutch companies do not appear to lag behind with respect to their CR 
disclosure, compared to companies in other countries (KPMG, 2015). With a slightly better than average 
reporting rate (approximately 80%), Dutch companies on average seem to demonstrate a pro-active attitude to 
sustainability. Nevertheless this most recent KPMG report on CR reporting also again concludes that the quality 
of CR reporting is eligible for improvement. This research aims to elucidate the current quality of voluntary CR 
reporting by companies, listed on the primary Dutch stock markets, and to identify possible contemporary 
determinants of this voluntary strategical corporate action. Insight in the motives for voluntary CR disclosure may 
shed some light on the possible necessity of near future legislative arrangements by the Dutch government to 
attain environmental objectives, if it cannot be trusted to the discretion of firms' managers. This will depend on 
the firms' adoption of their societal responsibilities, that may be displayed by their CR reporting. One theory to 
explain voluntary CR reporting is the legitimacy theory. 
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Thus, the central question of this paper pertains to the determinants of the quality of voluntary CR disclosures, of 
companies listed on the Dutch stock markets: which factors do determine the voluntary corporate disclosure of 
adequate CR information? Research literature shows that the theoretical perspective on voluntary CR disclosure 
shifts from economical theories to socio-political theories (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015), legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory providing the most commonly adopted frameworks. However, literature also shows 
inconclusive and even contradictory results from the various conducted legitimacy based empirical studies, for 
which no generally accepted reason has been forwarded. This study shows that former elaboration of the 
legitimacy theory has turned it into an intrinsically inconsistent construct, only able to predict "dishonest" 
corporate behavior in CR reporting. This may contribute to the inconsistencies and contradictions in empirical 
research. Subsequently, the operationalization of legitimacy theory using the legitimacy strategy framework as 
proposed by Lindblom (1994) is elaborated in a consistent way, to enable assessment of determinants of the 
quality of voluntary CR disclosure. 
Following numerous scholars (e.g. Clarkson, Overell & Chapple, 2011; Cho & Patten, 2007), this study will adopt 
legitimacy theory as the theoretical framework to assess the corporate deployment of voluntary CR disclosure. 
While earlier studies generally aim to substantiate the validity of legitimacy theory with "window-dressing" 
disclosures only, this study recognizes all possible voluntary CR disclosures within its operationalized legitimacy 
framework: a firm may pursue various legitimacy strategies, also strategies involving honest disclosure. 
Furthermore, the quality of voluntary CR disclosure has previously been assessed in various ways, mostly by 
content analysis based on researcher-constructed disclosure indices. We argue that the provision of quantitative 
information is a reporting quality indicator that covers various relevant reporting quality attributes, and will be 
associated with the firm's motives for CR disclosure, i.e. the choice of legitimacy strategy to be pursued. 
According to legitimacy theory, explaining generally why firms voluntarily would engage in CR disclosure, firms 
will increasingly feel a societal pressure to guard and manage their legitimacy, depending on their size and 
visibility. To manage their legitimacy, firms will adopt a certain legitimacy strategy, for which Lindblom (1994) has 
provided a framework of distinct alternative approaches, from actually adopting, improving and reporting 
corporate responsible behavior to gaining legitimacy by just eloquently claiming societal responsibility (without 
any substantial ground). Both the external pressure and the subsequently adopted legitimacy strategy will finally 
affect the quantitative quality of voluntary CR disclosure. The more genuine legitimacy strategy will render more 
quantitative reporting, because sustainability is actually managed (which also ensures the availability of data to 
be reported) and because actual efforts and improvements are more likely to be reported. A more deceptive (or 
even absent) legitimacy strategy will probably render less quantitative reporting, since there may be nothing to 
faithfully report on, or the actual figures may be threatening to the firm's legitimacy. So whether firms engage in 
quantitative CR disclosure depends on the adopted legitimacy strategy, under internal and external pressures. 
Usually, the choice of a particular strategy is made by the firm's management. Previously, in research little 
attention has been granted to the influence of the managers' predispositions, perceptions and attitudes on this 
choice, possibly associated with more observable CEO characteristics. And since the CEO's strategic discretion is 
usually limited by corporate governance mechanisms, the firm's board may be assumed to affect the influence of 
the CEO's attributes on the legitimacy strategy and subsequent quantitative CR disclosure. We expect the quality 
of voluntary CR disclosure to signal a specific legitimacy strategy, adopted under influence of its antecedents. 
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Insight in the determinants of voluntary CR disclosures may contribute to the understanding of the corporate and 
managerial motives for this voluntary strategic communication. This understanding may also contribute to the 
expectations regarding the faithfulness and credibility of the disclosures.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of contemporary literature pertaining to 
voluntary CR disclosure, identifying existing research on the various aspects and determinants of CR reporting 
and illuminating the prevailing contradictions and inconsistencies in the research results, for which no generally 
accepted explanation is available. We conclude that the theoretical foundations for explaining voluntary CR 
disclosure are still under-specified, and represented by a rather confusing multitude of theories, not easy to fully 
apprehend, let alone to apply in a comprehensive manner. It is demonstrated that one of the most applied 
theories in voluntary CR disclosure, the legitimacy theory, is commonly operationalized into an intrinsically 
inconsistent construct. This may very well be one of the causes of the inconclusiveness and inconsistencies the 
application of the theory still exposes. The application is usually limited to the "avoidance" legitimizing strategy. 
This does not correspond to the basic presumptions of legitimacy: several legitimacy strategies are feasible, to be 
decided upon by the firm's management. The quality of the voluntary CR disclosure may well be an indication of 
this decision, possibly revealing the manager's perception of corporate responsibilities. Next, the quality of 
voluntary CR disclosure is addressed, providing an overview of various approaches and arguing that quantitative 
reporting can serve as an adequate proxy for several reporting quality attributes. Quantitative reporting is 
arguably an essential component of corporate responsible behavior and an indication for a sincere legitimacy 
strategy. The legitimacy-flowchart is introduced to distinguish between the various possible legitimacy strategies 
associated with the observed quantitative quality of CR disclosure. Based on the provided theoretical framework, 
hypotheses are stated with respect to the determinants of the quality of voluntary environmental CR disclosure. 
Section 3 further describes the conceptual model, variables and methods employed in this study. It particularly 
describes the content analysis approach to determine the quantitative quality of environmental disclosure based 
on GRI's G4 criteria, as well as the deduction of the implied legitimacy strategy. Section 4 shows the descriptions 
and results of the gathered data and statistics. It appears that the firms listed on the Dutch stock markets still do 
not adequately report on all quantifiable environmental items as required by the GRI standard: only 30% of 
quantifiable environmental measures is reported in compliance with the standards in 2015. For example, water 
recycling, environmental expenditures and environmental grievances are hardly reported at all. General reporting 
on the environmental burden of firms thus may be considered to be unsatisfying. With respect to the adopted 
legitimacy strategy, as deducted from the voluntary environmental disclosures, most often a social responsible 
strategy is found to be pursued, while over 20% of the firms only present environmental narratives and 11% of 
the firms do not express any environmental responsibility at all in their annual reporting. As expected, firm size is 
found to be a significant determinant of quantitative environmental reporting, confirming our hypotheses H1. 
The industry's environmental impact is not found to be of any importance for voluntary quantitative 
environmental disclosure and hypothesis H2 is not confirmed. Regarding the influence of the CEO's perceptions 
and predispositions on the strategic legitimacy choices and subsequent environmental disclosure, CEO 
remuneration appears to be positively associated with quantitative environmental reporting, while CEO age does 
not show an association with this dependent variable. The assumed negative association as a consequence of the 
adverse economical and social perspectives could not be determined, and the assumptions as expressed by 
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hypotheses H3 and H4 could not be confirmed. Finally, board independence appears to have a moderating effect 
on the association between the CEO's characteristics and quantitative environmental reporting, confirming 
hypothesis H5. Section 5 completes this study with conclusions, reservations and suggestions. The former 
application and operationalization of legitimacy theory in earlier studies is questioned, the interpretation of the 
theory being too narrow to support adequate predictions of general organizational behavior. Corporate 
responsible behavior was judged to be incompatible with legitimacy theory, possibly in an attempt to oppose the 
theory against the traditional economical theories, which were associated with sincere corporate behavior. 
Legitimacy theory will need to be operationalized more thoroughly, comprehensively and broadly, to be able to 
account for any corporate behavior. Moreover, legitimacy theory should be mounted on a clear normative 
foundation, if it is to be generally taken into account in strategic organizational and managerial decision-making. 
To illustrate a wider application of the legitimacy theory, the legitimacy-flowchart was introduced, distinguishing 
possible legitimacy strategies of firms. This flowchart was used to deduct the adopted strategy from quantitative 
environmental reporting, in pursue of possible determinants of voluntary CR disclosure. Despite the opposition 
from the firmly institutionalized economical perspective (Friedman, 1953), corporate social responsibility seems to 
have passed the stage of a disputable aspect of economical business, taken into account fundamentally by most 
firms. Negligence of social responsibilities is not acceptable anymore and still declining, although at a 
disappointing rate. Based on the results of this study, firms could be more strongly encouraged to disclose their 
CR activities and results, in order to attain verifiability, credibility and ultimately legitimacy. These disclosures 
should contain the required quantitative elements (e.g. corresponding to GRI's G4 requirements) in order to be 
verifiable and credible, and to sufficiently support a legitimacy claim. The numbers tell the tale. 
To ensure future viability and applicability, the legitimacy theory has to be upgraded with the clear delineation of 
a normative component, similar to the stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), to clearly and 
undeniably express the importance of legitimacy as a prerequisite for any business, to be gained and maintained 
by actual corporate responsible behavior. The balance of societal and economical responsibilities should be left 
to society's judgement, requiring accountability in return for the granted rights to conduct a business. And finally, 
the interpretation and operationalization of legitimacy theory should recognize all possible legitimacy strategies. 
Legitimacy theory explaining opportunistic reporting versus economic theory explaining sincere reporting: it is 
counterintuitive. Legitimacy theory does not have to be contrasted with the traditional economic perspective; 
these theories are simultaneously applicable and certainly not mutually exclusive. 
2. Voluntary CR disclosure - theoretical framework 
2.1. Literature review 
The threat of legislation on corporate disclosures has repeatedly evoked academic discussions about the 
necessity of governmental interference, concerning both financial information (Healy & Palepu, 2001) and 
information about CR (Nyquist, 2003; Cooper & Owen, 2007). In these discussions, the credibility of voluntary CR 
disclosures appears to be an issue (Lock & Seele, 2016), and various researchers have expressed the need for 
improvement of the level of CR reporting by mandatory CR reporting requirements (Leong, Hazelton, Taplin, 
Timms, & Laurence, 2014), to increase the credibility of CR reporting (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007) and to reduce 
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the opportunities for companies to disclose biased or even misleading information (Adams, 2004; Gray, 2005). 
The issue whether to extort reliable CR disclosures by mandatory reporting requirements may be served by 
understanding the corporate motives to voluntarily disclose information. Ever since companies have engaged in 
voluntary CR disclosures, a vast amount of research has been dedicated to the various aspects of CR reporting, 
often intended to find explanations for the very occurrence of voluntary disclosures. 
The field of CR disclosure research is comprehensively outlined by various reviews (a.o. Gray, 2005; Hahn & 
Kühnen, 2013; Hahn, Reimsbach, & Schiemann, 2015). These reviews reveal an enormous amount of collected 
knowledge from many scientific studies, and together with the literature review sections of these studies, an 
extensive overview of the aspects and determinants of CR disclose can be acquired. Research has been aimed at 
company characteristics (e.g. Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011, sometimes referred to as internal determinants 
of CR disclosure, e.g. by Hahn & Kühnen (2013)), at external determinants like media exposure and sector 
affiliation (e.g. Kolk & Fortanier, 2013) and at the relation with governance aspects like board characteristics and 
ownership structures (e.g. Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2013, referred to as internal 
contextual factors by Adams (2002)). Furthermore, the relationship with CR performance (e.g. Weber, 2014), 
financial performance (e.g. Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016) and market response (e.g. Reverte, 2012) has been 
investigated, as well as the particular influence of stakeholders (Thijssens, Bollen, & Hassink, 2014). Regarding the 
determinants of voluntary CR disclosures, from the review by Hahn and Kühnen (2013) can be concluded that 
only company's size, visibility and sector-affiliation (industry) have consistently been found to be associated with 
CR disclosure. All other postulated determinants through the years show inconclusive or even contradictory 
results regarding their relationship with voluntary CR reporting. This demerit of the assembled body of research 
on voluntary CR disclosure has been noticed (a.o. Cormier, Gordon, & Magnan, 2004; Mahadeo, Oogarah-
Hanuman, & Soobaroyen, 2011; Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2013; Reverte, 2012) and 
broached by various researchers. According to Gray, Javad, Power, and Sinclair (2001) there is a number of 
obvious (and not so obvious) reasons why the studies should produce such inconsistent and even contradictory 
results, and they propose three reasons that at that time had been explored by literature: (1) failure to 
distinguish between voluntary and mandatory disclosures, (2) country differences, and (3) the lack of theoretical 
basis. They postulate that the lack of theoretical basis has largely been overcome, but subsequently admit the 
probability that the underlying theories are still insufficiently specified. They also address the possible need for 
systematic longitudinal analysis of corporate disclosure and characteristics, as relationships may only be revealed 
over time. More recently, Joseph and Taplin (2011) added the variation in measurement approaches as a possible 
reason for the inconsistency of results, and Bouten, Everaert, and Roberts (2012) also blame the definition and 
operationalization of the dependent variables, besides the failure to distinguish between the decisions to disclose 
and how much to disclose. Also according to Hooks and Van Staden (2011) the different methods of (content) 
analysis could be of concern. According to Trumpp, Endrikat, Zopf, and Guenther (2015) the pervasiveness of 
inconclusive empirical findings would have to be largely attributed to inconsistent approaches to defining and 
measuring corporate (environmental) performance. Preceding Gray et al. (2001), as mentioned earlier, also 
Ullmann (1985) considers a lack of comprehensive theory one of the main reasons for the inconsistencies in 
former research (Hooghiemstra, 2000). Whereas the contrasting results concerning the determinants of 
voluntary CR disclosure are based on theoretically founded hypotheses, also contradictory conclusions are drawn 
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with respect to the predicting value of the various underlying theories. In manifold circumstances, theoretically 
deducted hypotheses are either acknowledged or declined, thus supporting or dismissing the applied theory. 
While there is no general consensus concerning the reasons for the inconclusive and contradictory results of the 
various empirical studies, there neither seems to be a matter of a clear theoretical framework with clear 
foundations and implications, that may be generally accepted. Moreover, a thorough investigation of the various 
empirical studies raises questions about the selection of control variables and proxies, as well as questions 
regarding the underlying assumptions. And while not being universally accepted, the theoretical framework for 
CR disclosure may be considered to be very complex, contributed to by a multitude of theories. And although in 
2001 Gray deemed the lack of theoretical basis to have been largely overcome, in 2005 he states that the "well-
serving" theories of CR accountability and reporting remain under-specified: "… whilst such theories are useful as 
sensitising mechanisms, as aids to focus and as a means to articulate data, they lack the precision and specificity 
that would be necessary to fully explain reporting or accounting behavior" (Gray, 2005, p. 16).  
2.2. Theories explaining voluntary CR disclosure  
Besides the most commonly applied theories, as noted in the review of Hahn and Kühnen (2013): legitimacy 
theory, stakeholder theory, signaling theory and institutional theory, one could also encounter "voluntary 
disclosure theory" (e.g. Cho, Freedman, & Patten, 2012; Guidry and Patten, 2012), "resource dependency theory" 
(Peters & Romi, 2015; Chiu & Wang, 2015; Jamali, 2008), "agency theory" (a.o. Pérez, 2015; Herbohn, 2005; 
Lightstone & Driscoll, 2008), "impression management theory" (Hooghiemstra, 2000), "reputation risk 
management theory" (Pérez, 2015), "political economy theory" (Van der Laan, 2009; Odera, Scott, & Gow, 2016), 
"proprietary costs theory" (Scott, 1994; Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005) and "social contract theory" 
(Jamali, 2008). And perhaps one or two were overlooked. Enough theories to choose from, but the theories still 
do not appear to offer a solid foundation for rigorous research, the research qualified by Ullman (1985) as "data 
in search of a theory". It is not a coincidence that there was a vivid and interesting discussion in the late 20
th
 
century about the notion of strong (versus weak) theory in social sciences (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995; 
DiMaggio, 1995). 
Economic theories 
These theories are typically based on self-interest and value maximization of economic agents. Ever since 
corporate sustainability appeared on the societal agenda, accounting researchers have made efforts to explain 
voluntary corporate disclosures using the traditional economic perspective, where a basic principle is provided by 
the agency theory: a principal (i.e. the shareholders of a company) employs the services of the agent (i.e. the 
manager or CEO of the company) and delegates the decision-making authority to the agent (Rankin, Stanton, 
McGowan, Ferlauto, & Tilling, 2012). Although the agent has a legal and fiduciary obligation to act in the best 
interest of the principal, the agent is also presumed to be a utility maximizer and pursue self-interest. Would a 
manager act like a perfect steward and in the best interest of the shareholders, maximal shareholder value would 
be pursued. Viewed from this perspective, the decision-making concerning CR disclosures will be made based on 
economic considerations, with the only interest being the shareholders' interests. This implies that the manager 
will engage in voluntary (or discretionary) disclosure if the shareholders' value may be expected to benefit from 
the disclosure, i.e. the profits (or avoided costs) will exceed the reporting costs. All this has resulted in several 
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sub-theories within the traditional economic framework. Voluntary disclosure theory (VDT) considers disclosure 
as a tool of communication with market participants, to reduce information asymmetries between managers and 
investors (and to reduce adverse selection). This theory may explain CR disclosure to some extent, but the 
applicability may be questionable if the disclosure is aimed at others than market participants (Guidry and 
Patten, 2012). Signaling theory supposes that the agent credibly conveys some information about itself to 
another party (e.g. the principal). Although this theory may not be completely equal to VDT, it certainly 
resembles VDT and seems to address the same communication process. This theory is part of the contract 
theory, concerning how economic actors construct contractual arrangements, generally assuming information 
asymmetries. As usual in traditional economics, people are assumed to be utility maximizers, and one prominent 
application of the contract theory is the design of managerial remuneration. According to Connelly, Certo, 
Ireland, and Reutzel (2011), signaling theory focuses primarily on the deliberate communication of positive 
information to achieve advantage and negative signals are regarded as unintended collaterals. It should be noted 
that although partially conflicting interests are recognized and dishonest signaling is not precluded by this theory, 
in its general application only honest signaling is assumed (i.e. if honest signaling is found, signaling theory is 
concluded to be valid, ignoring the possibility of false signaling). Proprietary costs theory recognizes the costs of 
preparing, disseminating and auditing information, and of disclosing competitive information (which is potentially 
detrimental to future earnings), and stating that, based on economical considerations, companies will limit 
voluntary disclosure because of these costs. Proprietary costs may be regarded as a constraint for voluntary 
disclosure, under no circumstances stimulating it. Resource dependence theory (RDT) addresses how the external 
resources of organizations affect the behavior of the organization, as formalized by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). 
Since resource dependency is directly linked with power, in voluntary CR disclosure research the RDT is often 
used in the context of the (instrumental) stakeholder management perspective, where power is an essential 
element of stakeholder salience (Chiu & Wang, 2015; Jamali, 2008). 
For a long time, the traditional economic perspective was paramount in accounting research. But times change 
and societal developments calve other priorities and perspectives, as recognized by Freeman (1984). The 
economical theories, assuming man to be guided by self-interest and personal utility maximization, are 
associated with a normative foundation that no longer sufficiently corresponds to the prevailing societal 
perception, also visible through developments in legal opinion and statutory law (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
The economic theories seem to lack sufficient moral perspective, human motives being purely based on 
economical grounds. Economic theories have shown to influence institutional designs and social norms, acting as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, allowing corporations to sacrifice externalities and to pursue shareholder value and self-
interest at the expense of the interests of others. Economic theory thus legitimizes and stimulates immoral 
behavior by explaining this behavior with economical regularities, built on a series of "half-truths" (Mintzberg, 
Simons, & Basu, 2000). Meanwhile, the justification of the shareholder value maximization objective, central to 
economic theories, does not hold, even against a utilitarian moral standard (Jones & Felps, 2013). The self-
fulfilling prophecy of the economic perspective and its influence on morality lead to a picture of excessive 
managerial compensation, earnings management and opportunistic and manipulative behavior by managers, 
more or less taken for granted. As a relationship between CR reporting and earnings management already has 
been confirmed (Yip, Van Staden, & Cahan, 2011; Hong & Andersen, 2010), concerns about the faithfulness of 
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voluntary CR disclosures may arise. Assuming the traditional economic perspective, a manager may be expected 
to use his discretionary powers only in service of shareholder value or self-interest, the (potential) costs being a 
pivotal factor. Corporate decisions may be significantly determined by the characteristics and values of the 
manager, supposed to be a resourceful evaluative maximizer (REMM, Jensen & Meckling, 1994). In this context, it 
might be hard to put faith in the normative foundations of economics to sufficiently guard societal interests. Due 
to the debate concerning the moral responsibilities to society, the public opinion and research attention have 
shifted towards socio-political theories, emerging the political economy theory, from which both legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory are derived (Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996). The central view of this theory is that 
society, politics and economies are inseparable, and economic issues cannot purposefully be investigated in the 
absence of considerations about the political, social and institutional framework in which the economic activity 
takes place. The socio-political theories aim to have the interests of all stakeholders considered in corporate 
decision-making. The shift towards this perspective is demonstrated by Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), showing 
the weakening influence of the prevailing agency logic and the gradual emergence of a stakeholder focus. The 
stakeholder approach calls for managers to take into account the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, 
including shareholders, rather than to act solely in the interest of shareholders, as called for by the stewardship 
theory (Tricker, 2015). 
Socio-political theories 
Stakeholder theory is primarily based on the seminal work of Freeman (1984), the essential prescription being 
that serving the interests of all stakeholders is an objective in itself, rather than a means to increase shareholder 
value. This normative point of departure implies an obligation to all stakeholders on moral grounds, the interests 
of the stakeholders having intrinsic value, as perceived by the stakeholders themselves. These interests should be 
incorporated in corporate strategies and decisions, including the discretionary disclosure of all information 
stakeholders would find useful. Donaldson and Preston (1995) have refined the stakeholder theory in a 
comprehensive review, proposing the stakeholder theory to consist of three layers: a descriptive, an instrumental 
and a normative layer, the latter being the "core" of the theory and providing the foundations for justification. 
Legitimacy theory is in certain ways linked to shareholder theory and intended to understand corporate action 
and activities, particularly relating to social and environmental issues (Rankin et al., 2012). The central reasoning 
behind the legitimacy theory asserts that the corporation is granted legitimacy (the right to conduct a business) 
by society, but in return should adhere to the requirements and expectations of this society, one expectation 
obviously being corporate responsibility and accountability. This accountability axiomatically involves CR 
disclosure. The obvious agreeability of this reasoning provides a sound foundation for a normative theory, but 
nevertheless the legitimacy theory is usually labeled as a positive theory (e.g. Rankin et al., 2012). This intuitive 
tension might bother the empirical application of the theory and perhaps contribute to the earlier determined 
inconsistencies and contradictory results of the various empirical research. The corporate obligation to society 
owing to its legitimacy, is expressed by the notion of the "social contract": an imaginary representation of the 
societal expectations. Non-compliance may result in loss of autonomy or even endanger survival. As cited by 
Patten (1992), Shocker and Sethi (1974) explain: "Any social institution -- and business is no exception -- operates 
in society via a social contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are based on: (1) the 
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delivery of some socially desirable ends to society in general, and (2) the distribution of economic, social, or 
political benefits to groups from which it derives its power. In a dynamic society, neither the sources of 
institutional power nor the needs for its services are permanent. Therefore, an institution must constantly meet 
the twin tests of legitimacy and relevance by demonstrating that society requires its services and that the groups 
benefiting from its rewards have society's approval" (Patten, 1992, p. 471). According to Suchman (1995), 
legitimacy can be considered as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions”. As simple and straightforward these theoretical concepts may appear, science has managed to 
transform these fundamentals into a quite peculiar operationalization. Consistent with common economic 
principles and positive accounting theories, the theory has evolved to allow for opportunistic behavior of 
corporations (i.e. their executive management), to enable explanation of actual practices. The theorizing process 
has developed the legitimacy theory in this tradition of economic theories according to the following reasoning. 
Based on the premise of legitimacy, organizations are assumed to establish congruence between the social values 
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger social system of 
which they are part (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Consequently, Richardson (1987) asserted accounting is a 
legitimating institution, and subsequently Lindblom (1994) devised that an organization may employ certain 
‘legitimating’ strategies: 
1) change its output, methods or goals to conform with the expectations of its relevant publics, and then 
inform these relevant public of the change; 
2) not change its output, methods or goals, but demonstrate the appropriateness of its output, methods or 
goals through education and information; 
3) try to alter the perceptions of relevant public by associating itself with symbols that have a high 
legitimate status; and 
4) try to alter societal expectations by aligning them with the organization's output, goals or methods. 
According to Van der Laan (2009), these strategies originate from and thus reveal managerial motivation for CR 
disclosure. The first two strategies appearing to be genuine, the third strategy has an undeniable semblance of 
avoidance and diversion, while the fourth strategy appears rather opportunistic, if not even infeasible. With this 
variety of possible underlying objectives, the theory could be expected to predict disclosures of all kinds. The 
third strategy is apparently not aiming at actually grounded legitimacy but rather at the perception of legitimacy, 
seemingly inconsistent with the core presumption of the theory that the corporation has an obligation to adhere 
to the expectations of society. Van der Laan (2009) states that the sophistication and understanding of the 
application of the legitimacy theory have been refined as a result of the grown adoption of the theory in social 
and environmental accounting research. This, however, is not supported by the results of the numerous research 
studies, still exposing inconclusiveness, inconsistencies and contradictions. After citing Deegan (2002) that 
"arguably, analysis of CR disclosure utilizing legitimacy theory is flawed as it results in critique of the motivations 
for disclosure", Van der Laan subsequently argues that "this critique may be a natural consequence of analysis of 
motivations for CR disclosure, as disclosure is one response to a perceived threat to or gap in organizational 
legitimacy. Disclosure would not be required unless a section of society or ‘relevant’ public is questioning the 
appropriateness of the organization's output, methods or goals" (Van der Laan, 2009, p. 22). Here, a crucial point 
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is completely missed: the narrow operationalization of the theory's fundamentals. Moreover, it could be argued 
that the legitimacy theory's core principles imply that society is (virtually) permanently questioning the 
appropriateness of the organization's output, methods or goals, or at least that the organization should act 
according to that presumption. Allowing for the discretion of the firm's management to decide whether 
legitimacy calls for disclosure is not consistent with the idea that the stakeholders' expectations possess intrinsic 
value (Freeman, 1984). The contemporary perception of the legitimacy theory seems to be consistent with the 
traditional view of corporate responsibilities, as reflected by the pyramid of corporate responsibilities proposed 
by Carroll (1991): economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities (in that order of priorities). The 
founding principles of legitimacy theory would arguably suggest a different order. A key question here concerns 
the extent to which a theoretical framework has normative qualities. Jones and Felps (2013) address the practical 
difficulty of distinguishing between descriptive theory and normative theory, being mutually influential. A 
normative theory is often drawn from experiences and research in practice, making it difficult to distinguish 
between the normative and instrumental elements of theory. For a more enlightened view on the relationships 
between legitimacy and stakeholder theories, it could be useful to describe the legitimacy theory in terms of the 
three layers as used by Donaldson and Preston (1995) to describe the stakeholder theory, in order to allow for a 
clear delineation and definition of the normative level of the legitimacy theory. 
The political economy perspective dictates obligations of the firm to its environment, legitimacy theory defining 
this environment to be society as a whole, while stakeholder theory provides a perspective more appropriate at 
an instrumental level. Stakeholders can be regarded as a concrete (instrumental) representation of the societal 
environment of the organization, each stakeholder attending to certain legitimate interests in a particular aspect 
of corporate responsibility. At the instrumental level, by using the stakeholder definition of Freeman (1984), i.e. 
"all individuals and groups who influence or are influenced by the company", society is adequately represented to 
guard its interests and expectations. These interests also concern potential benefits or harm, experienced or 
expected to experience, as a consequence of the firm's actions or negligence of action. Resulting from 
information asymmetries, the manager possess CR information that is not available to stakeholders, but which 
they will find useful to assess the legitimacy of the firm. This information should be faithfully conveyed by the 
manager to respect the interests and societal responsibilities of the stakeholders. Legitimacy theory should allow 
for this desirable course of action, but in the common operationalization of legitimacy theory, it doesn’t. Usually, 
legitimacy theory is assumed to predict deviating disclosure based on the strategy to try to alter the perceptions 
of relevant publics by associating itself with symbols that have a high legitimate status (Lindblom, 1994). For 
example, typical predictions made in empirical research based on the prevailing operationalization of legitimacy 
theory are: "High-risk companies adopt symbolic management by selectively releasing information; high-risk 
companies symbolically manage legitimacy by using ambiguous language" (Lightstone & Driscoll, 2008). This 
strangely limited interpretation of legitimacy theory clearly flaws its utilization and applicability. It feels 
counterintuitive, in violation with the premise of an ethical obligation towards society and its representing 
stakeholders. 
Another theory closely related to legitimacy theory is institutional theory, considering how rules, norms and 
routines become established as authoritative guidelines, and how these elements are created, adopted and 
adapted over time. In order to survive, organizations need to conform to the rules and belief systems that prevail 
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in the environment and this will earn the organization legitimacy (Rankin et al., 2012). The decoupling dimension 
of institutional theory refers to the actual organizational practices deviating from the formal, institutionalized 
(apparent) practices. This resembles the third strategy as devised by Lindblom (1994), and seems to be linked to 
another encountered theory in voluntary disclosure: the "impression management theory", regarding CR 
reporting as a public relations vehicle, aimed at influencing people’s perceptions (Pérez, 2015; Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007; Hooghiemstra, 2000). 
When examining existing empirical studies on voluntary CR disclosure, inconsistent results are to be expected if 
the theory itself is intrinsically inconsistent. Legitimacy theory could predict faithful and accurate disclosure, 
according to certain legitimacy strategies (Lindblom, 1994), but at the same time could predict evasive and 
possible misleading disclosure when another legitimacy strategy is pursued by the firm's management. Oddly 
enough, only the evasive option is adopted to be evincing legitimacy theory. It is arguably not sensible that 
socially responsible behavior would invalidate the legitimacy theory and contrarily support the validity of 
economical theory. All theories applied in voluntary CR disclosure are to a large extent complementary, and all 
may yield adequate predictions in particular circumstances. This is, for instance, demonstrated by Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson, & Vasvari (2008), revisiting the relationship between corporate environmental performance and the 
level of environmental disclosures, by testing competing predictions from economics based and socio-political 
theories of voluntary disclosure. They claim their results to be consistent with the predictions of the economics 
disclosure theory but inconsistent with the negative association predicted by socio-political theories, while 
subsequently showing that socio-political theories explain patterns in the data ("legitimization") that cannot be 
explained by economics disclosure theories. This example clearly supports the argument that the legitimacy 
theory would benefit from an amendment with all legitimacy strategies as proposed by Lindblom (1994), to 
resolve intrinsic inconsistencies. Clarkson et al. (2008) conclude that socio-political theories are not robust in 
predicting the level of discretionary disclosure, based on the assumption of a negative association between 
environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental disclosures. This assumption directly 
follows from the narrowness of the operationalization of legitimacy theory by restricting it's prediction to only 
the third legitimacy strategy (Lindblom, 1994). The prevailing choice of only this legitimacy strategy to represent 
the legitimacy theory rules out the possibility of firms' managers to choose for the faithful and legitimate 
strategy. The first strategical option proposed by Lindblom (1994) leads to the prediction of a positive 
relationship between environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental disclosures, but 
there is no obvious reason for the socio-political theories not to be confirmed by legitimate behavior. It is rather 
astonishing to note that former empirical research seems to systematically deny the adoption of other legitimacy 
strategies than just trying to alter the perception of firms' legitimacy within a legitimacy framework. 
Consequently, legitimacy theory only appears to be supported by evidence in case of impression management or 
reputation management, thus assuming economic responsibilities to prevail over ethical responsibilities. But as it 
is, legitimacy theory could predict any decision with respect to voluntary CR disclosure, when taking into account 
all possible legitimacy strategies as outlined by Lindblom (1994). Limiting the theory application to impression 
management only, the theory will remain to be disavowed by empirical results to the extent that managers 
genuinely and faithfully pursue legitimacy. This could very well contribute to the persistent inconsistencies and 
contradictories in the results of empirical research on voluntary CR disclosure.  
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Notwithstanding this demerit of the customary operationalization of the legitimacy theory, it has been used 
extensively to explain voluntary CR disclosure, in fact often demonstrating a corporate choice for impression 
management, i.e. the pursue of a positive but actually unfounded perception of legitimacy. CR disclosure appears 
to be a powerful legitimacy device rather than an effort towards greater accountability (Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho, 
2009). Cho, Freedman, and Patten (2012) find corroborating evidence that companies use the disclosure of 
environmental capital spending as a strategic tool to address their exposures to political and regulatory concerns, 
concluding that interpreting disclosed environmental information would appear to require careful understanding 
of the underlying motivations. They join Adams (2002) and Owen (2008), calling for more fieldwork-based 
investigations of managerial motivations, quoting Owen (2008) that “legitimizing disclosures can often be 
positively misleading”. This supports our argument that the decision regarding the legitimacy strategy pursued 
and subsequent CR disclosure is ultimately made by the firm's management. Our literature review shows that 
remarkably little attention has been granted to the influence of managers' characteristics on voluntary CR 
disclosure, even though this influence of managers' personal characteristics and values already has been 
recognized and managers appear to display unique disclosure styles (Smith Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010). 
Behavioral finance and CEO decision-making 
With the emergence of the "behavioral finance" perspective, a considerable amount of research has been 
dedicated to the influence of managers' cognitive biases and predispositions on their financial decision-making 
(Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2013; Kahneman, 2002; Lovallo & Sibony, 2006). Given the important role of the 
manager in the decision on CR disclosure, it is curious to find out that the managers' characteristics are not more 
generally stipulated to be a pivotal determinant for voluntary CR disclosure. Generally, the firm itself is taken as 
the object of study, while it is clearly the firm's executive leader that ultimately decides on strategic issues. The 
limited empirical attention to executives' values may be understood by consideration of the fact that the 
usefulness of focus on personal preferences is often deemed practically limited, since virtually anything can be 
explained as a matter of tastes (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013). However, as Hambrick and Mason (1984) have 
clearly pointed out with their "Upper Echelon Theory", the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in 
organizations may be expected to be reflected in organizational strategies and effectiveness. Also they propose 
that various executives' observable characteristics (e.g. age and education) may serve as indicators or proxies for 
their cognitive and value-based filters. Manner (2010), in his study on the impact of CEO characteristics on 
corporate social performance, uses this theory to find corporate social performance to be associated with the 
CEO's short-term compensation. The "Upper Echelon Theory" has been acknowledged in various business 
settings, relating many CEO characteristics to strategic decisions. This observation is of practical importance, 
since the CEOs' psychological and cognitive processes cannot be observed directly, and to catch values, cognitive 
biases and predispositions in psychometric measures seems hardly feasible. Fortunately, there is little doubt that 
demographic and other observable characteristics of executives, such as age, can often be used as indicators of 
the cognitive and value-based filters of the executives. This was demonstrated by Manner (2010), concluding that 
CR performance is another strategic issue where CEO characteristics can be used to predict firm outcomes. The 
(strategic) choice of legitimacy approach may thus be expected to depend on the CEO's values and cognitions, 
associated with certain observable characteristics. In their lecture on strategic leadership styles Carter and Greer 
(2013) assert that recent research has demonstrated that values emphasizing economics and concern for 
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stakeholders respectively, are associated with different leadership styles. Moreover, they suggest that the values 
of CEOs will be more important in the future as they balance the trade-offs of triple bottom line measures of 
performance. 
Voluntary CR disclosure is a matter of business ethics and social responsibility, first discussed in Bowen’s "Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman" (Bowen, 1953). In their discourse on responsible leadership, Waldman and 
Galvin (2008) address the manager's motivation in CR decisions, proposing that the stakeholder perspective may 
represent the more viable approach to responsible leadership while clearly confirming the importance of the 
executive manager's personal attitude and perceptions. The choice with respect to legitimacy strategy and 
subsequent CR disclosure is often associated with the degree of ethical leadership the executive manager 
exposes, and the (observable) determinants of this ethical inclination have to be determined. Following Waldman 
and Galvin (2008), addressing the executive manager's attitude in terms of the opposing economic and 
stakeholder perspectives, this study departs from the antipodal economic and legitimacy perspectives to assess 
the ethical degree of the executives' perception and valuation of responsibility. The economic perspective limits 
corporate responsibilities exclusively to shareholders' value; besides the denial of accountability towards 
stakeholders and society (affecting the willingness to disclose CR information), this perspective also has also 
shown to encourage excessive managerial compensation (as justified by the agency theory) and opportunistic 
behavior. The executive's "perceptual filtering" (England, 1967) may be expected to shape the prevailing 
perspective in the CEO's mind. Adhering solely to the traditional economic perspective will limit CR activities to 
legal and economical boundaries, while recognizing societal responsibilities may allow for a more progressive CR 
approach. In the traditional economic view, progressive CR behavior may even be expected to be punished 
through less compensation, as demonstrated by Jian and Lee (2015), finding that CEO compensation is negatively 
associated with "abnormal" CR investments and positively with "normal" CR investments ("normal" and 
"abnormal" referring to value-increasing and -decreasing CR investments respectively). Not surprisingly, CEOs' 
education has been identified to be associated with voluntary CR disclosure (e.g. Manner, 2010; Lewis, Walls & 
Dowell, 2014). Manner (2010) postulates that the education itself shapes values and behavioral beliefs, and that 
an economics education promotes a lack of emphasis on CR (discussions of ethics and CR are "conspicuous by 
their absence" in managerial economics textbooks). It is well demonstrated that legitimacy does not play a 
significant role in classic economics education, with possible consequences for the CEO's predispositions. 
However, a gradual shift in perceptions can be witnessed, from the (traditional economic) agency-based 
institutional logic towards the emergence of a stakeholder orientation (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015), where CR 
becomes more legitimate in the eyes of market participants, and the canonical writings of Milton Friedman 
concerning corporate responsibilities seem to become superseded by legitimacy considerations. Citing Davis 
(1973), Manner (2010) states: "…If society moves toward norms of social responsibility as it is now doing, then the 
businessman is subtly and inevitably guided by these same norms…".  
Meanwhile, the traditional economic beliefs prove to be persistently settled in perceptions. With respect to CEO 
characteristics, this is one of the mechanisms to relate the executive manager's age to the perception and 
attitude towards CR: older CEO's may adhere stronger to a classical economics perspective with a focus on 
shareholder value maximization, where younger executive managers may have been presented with more 
modernistic perspectives on corporate responsibilities and legitimacy, implying a negative association between 
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CEOs' age and CR. On the other hand, given a similar education, older CEO's might be expected to have gained 
more social expertise and cultural intelligence and be more inclined to "give back" to their communities, implying 
a positive association between CEOs' age and CR; this however is not found to be supported by empirical 
evidence (Fabrizi, Mallin, & Michelon, 2014). Another mechanism that (negatively) ties the CEO's age to CR 
activities is that of the "career horizon" (one of the usually recognized agency problems, e.g. by Rankin et al. 
(2012)), as demonstrated by Oh, Chang and Cheng (2016). They note that the significant impact of CEOs' career 
horizons on corporate strategic decisions and subsequent organizational outcomes has been consistently shown 
by literature. CEO career horizon is a psychological assessment of career security over career termination, and by 
definition affected by CEO age - as top managers are getting older their career horizons are getting shorter than 
an optimal period to maximize firm’s long-term value. Older CEOs with shorter career horizon are thus assumed 
to be less motivated to engage in CR, since they would tend to focus on short-term outcomes and not on long-
term activities (e.g. CR investments with outcome uncertainty) that may not be realized during their incumbency. 
It is found that CEO career horizon problems do matter for CR when CEO's have sufficient discretion over the 
firm's strategic decisions (Oh et al., 2016). While assuming the CEO's age to be negatively associated with CR 
quality, we should remember that any CEO can be aware of the ongoing shift in perceptions as mentioned earlier, 
and susceptibility for new developments may be very personal, as demonstrated by Posner (2009), presenting 
the case of a traditional CEO instantly turning his mindset to sustainability. This example shows that a possible 
association between age and perceptions of sustainability may be overruled by exceptions as a consequence of 
personal enlightenment, reminding us of the concerns with respect to the limited usefulness of personal 
preferences in empirical research, as noted before. 
Another CEO characteristic that has been shown to be associated with CR activities is the managerial 
compensation or remuneration. The (excessive) remuneration of executive managers finds its origin in the 
traditional economic agency-based perspective, that simultaneously promotes shareholder value maximization at 
the expense of social corporate responsibility and legitimacy. This implies a negative association between CEO 
remuneration and CR disclosure, which is shown by Fabrizi et al. (2014), finding that monetary incentives 
designed to align the CEO's and shareholders' interests specifically have a negative effect on CR. An explanation 
for this observation might be rooted in the traditional economic perspective opposing a legitimacy perspective, 
as outlined earlier. Jian and Lee (2015) distinguish normal (value increasing) and abnormal (value decreasing) CR. 
They refer to the prediction of a negative association between CR and CEO compensation (considering this to be 
contrary to conventional wisdom) as the "value-destruction" hypothesis. And indeed they also find that CEO 
compensation is negatively associated with CR investment, where it concerns "abnormal" CR investment. It 
should be noted that their "abnormal" qualification solely originates from an economic perspective; a legitimacy 
perspective might consider such CR investments quite normal, taking into account societal concerns. McGuire, 
Dow and Argheyd (2003) show that CEO compensation has a positive association with weak social performance. 
Another sound argument for a negative association between CR and CEO compensation is provided by Manner 
(2010): a very high level of compensation might itself represent a form of poor CR and a lack of consideration for 
social issues and legitimacy. 
However, the manager's discretion regarding strategic decisions is not unlimited, and usually restricted by 
corporate governance mechanisms. Jian and Lee (2015) demonstrate that corporate governance structures play 
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an important role in monitoring and rewarding CR investment. One governance mechanism is the supervisory 
board of the firm, watching over the executive managers' decisions and activities. The CEO's decisions may 
therefore be expected to be influenced by the board's independence, i.e. the moderating role of CEO power 
relative to the board (Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013). This moderating role of managerial discretion is for 
instance also noted by Wu, Kwan, Yim, Chiu, and He (2015) and Oh et al. (2016), mentioning board characteristics 
as an identified factor in CR research. Fabrizi et al. (2014) find that the proportion of independent directors is 
significantly and positively related to CSR, concluding that more independent boards are more likely to serve CR 
interests. The independence of the board will not directly affect the voluntary CR disclosure, but may be 
expected to influence the executive manager's predispositions, attitudes and perceptions that determine the 
resulting discretionary CR disclosure. According to Chin et al. (2013), CEOs’ power will influence the degree to 
which their inclinations are reflected in a firm’s decisions: when CEO's have substantial power, their personal 
values will be more vividly reflected in CR initiatives. It should also be noted that firm size may also influence 
managerial discretion: large organizations generally have organizational inertia because they have established 
routines and hierarchical structures and are less likely to be influenced by CEO leadership (Wu et al., 2015). 
2.3. The quality of voluntary CR reporting 
The quality of CR disclosure has occupied many researchers, searching for methods to assess the CR disclosures, 
and many ingenious, sophisticated and sensible methods for the analysis of CR reports have been proposed. 
Whereas (expert, but still subjective) analyst disclosure rankings are not generally appropriately available, often 
researcher-constructed disclosure indices are invented and applied. Assessing CR disclosure quality generally 
demands a content analysis approach, mostly involving subjective evaluation. Many studies use content analysis 
to analyze themes of disclosures, enclosing word or line counts to measure the amount of disclosure, intended to 
be used as a proxy for disclosure quality. Wiseman (1982) provided an indexing procedure to evaluate the quality 
and accuracy of environmental disclosures made in corporate annual reports, offering a detailed measure of 
environmental disclosure contents. Wiseman already assigned the highest possible score to monetary or 
quantitative measures, "since these are recommended as the preferred disclosure form". This particular approach 
is similarly adopted by many researchers (e.g. Patten, 1992; Walden & Schwartz, 1997; Cormier & Magnan, 
1999). Motivated by the mixed results of previous empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate 
environmental performance and the level of environmental disclosures, Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari 
(2008) develop a content analysis index based on the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines to assess the extent 
of discretionary disclosures in environmental and social responsibility reports. They attribute the former mixed 
results to "the choice of non-discretionary disclosure channels and use of the Wiseman (1982) index". Clarkson, 
Overell, and Chapple (2011) apply the Clarkson et al. (2008) GRI-based index, explaining the advantages of this 
index: (1) exclusive focus on discretionary disclosures that relate to a firm’s commitment to protect the 
environment, (2) it facilitates the identification of the nature of the disclosure and thereby potentially allows 
insights into management’s motives for disclosure, and (3) firms voluntarily disclosing information in a manner 
consistent with the GRI guidelines have opted for a format that will, by the nature of the standards, result in hard 
disclosures not easily imitated by poor environmental performers (Clarkson et al., 2011). These last two 
advantages are also essential assumptions for our reasoning. Various researchers apply a content analysis index 
similar to Clarkson et al. (2008) (e.g. Herbohn, Walker, & Loo, 2014; Bachoo, Tan, & Wilson, 2013; Burgwal & 
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Oliveira Vieira, 2012). The content analysis of Lock and Seele (2016) delves into the credibility of CR disclosures, 
finding understandability to be a precondition and quality of content to be the main credibility factor. As they 
state: "… That way, CSR reports become crucial facilitators of understanding between companies and 
stakeholders, which ultimately constitutes moral legitimacy and thus companies' license to operate in society" 
(Lock & Seele, 2016, p. 194). 
This overview shows that the concept of disclosure quality has been given various interpretations in CR disclosure 
research. There are many definitions for the complex concept of quality, being of context-sensitive and subjective 
nature. We adopt the narrow, positive meaning of the word, used in the sense of "good property" or 
adequateness. Various interpretations of this quality concept have been proposed, like "fitness for use" (Juran, 
1951), "free from defects" and "conformance to requirements" (Crosby, 1979) and the ISO (ISO 8402, 1994) 
definition: "the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bears its ability to satisfy stated 
or implied needs." This all appears to remain of rather abstract and complex nature. The key however is in 
"subjective": quality criteria or measures should be determined by the subject, i.e. the receiver or user. This 
primary origin of quality is essential for our reasoning: in case of CR disclosure, its quality should depend on the 
perceptions of the stakeholders. So, when determining the attributes of CR disclosure quality, the interests, 
concerns, expectations and preferences of the representatives of society (i.e. the stakeholders) should be kept in 
mind: their stated or implied needs. 
When the abstract notion of quality is to be assessed or evaluated, it needs to be translated to "measurable" 
characteristics on the operational level, appropriate in the perspective of the "customer", in the case of voluntary 
CR disclosure being all stakeholders representing society for legitimacy. Appropriate quality characteristics might 
be derived from standards addressing CR disclosure. Since CR disclosure can be considered a part of corporate 
accounting, an obvious starting point for disclosure quality would be the IASB/FASB guidelines and regulations 
(IASB, 2010). Although various postulated quality attributes (e.g. relevance and faithful representation) may be 
appropriate for sustainability accounting as well, it is also clear that the IASB/FASB guidelines and regulations 
typically refer to financial accounting and that the proposed quality attributes cannot be assumed to be 
correspondingly applicable to sustainability disclosure. Certain particularities of financial reporting do affect the 
reporting qualities and their interpretation. Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that GRI has taken the IASB/FASB 
works into account while developing its sustainability reporting guidelines, especially since GRI and IASB are now 
collaborating under the umbrella of the "Corporate Reporting Dialogue", aiming to align the direction, content 
and development of the various reporting frameworks and standards. The advantage of standards is that many 
competent and knowledgeable experts have been involved in a well-advised process to produce the resulting 
documents. GRI's G4 (GRI, 2013) divides the quality attributes in "principles for defining report content" 
(stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context, materiality and completeness) and "principles for defining 
report quality" (balance, comparability, accuracy, timeliness, clarity, reliability). A more general view on CR 
disclosures (i.e. another level of abstraction), would require the firm to be socially responsible, responsive and 
transparent, which would require the quality attributes relevance (or appropriateness), credibility, verifiability 
and of course understandability, as mentioned by Lock and Seele (2016). Given the general concerns about the 
faithfulness and reliability of the CR disclosures (e.g. Beets & Souther, 1999; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 
2013; Al-Tuwaijria, Christensen, &Hughes II, 2004), especially understandability, reliability, comparability and 
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verifiability would be of paramount importance. Having identified relevant and appropriate attributes of 
disclosure quality the next step would be to attach a measure and criterion to the attribute of concern, to be able 
to qualify (or classify) disclosures based on this quality attribute. In case of CR disclosure research usually proxies 
are determined, measurable entities assumed to adequately represent the immeasurable entity under 
consideration. The provision of quantitative information in CR disclosures can be assumed to be a proxy for many 
of the CR disclosure quality attributes just listed, and would be an adequate indication for voluntary CR disclosure 
quality. The numbers tell the tale. Measurement and quantitative disclosure generally have been recognized to 
be important. As we observe in most content analyses, quantitative information is awarded the highest scores in 
determining disclosure quality, implying that most researchers recognize the importance of quantitative 
information, although this is rarely explicitly pronounced. Financial reporting by firms, since a long time 
mandated by legislation, would be unthinkable without quantitative information. Analysts would hardly be able 
to analyze financial disclosures, let alone to produce reliable forecasts. Investors would be in the blind, 
accountants out of a job and information asymmetry almost 100%. Fortunately, firms' management would 
(according to the stewardship theory) voluntary provide the required numbers, or be compelled to do so by 
mandatory IFRS or GAAP directives. Why should this be different with respect to the corporate responsibility 
aspects of the firms' operations? 
GRI's "Reporting principles and standard disclosures" guideline explicitly and emphatically requires quantitative 
information, especially concerning ecological aspects, to be useful to stakeholders, for instance enabling them to 
assess the materiality of their concerns. Often, companies refrain from reporting specific quantitative 
information, relying on disclosures that cannot be readily substantiated. According to Alrazi, Sulaiman, and 
Ahmad (2009), environmental disclosures have been predominantly narrative in nature; very few companies 
disclose quantitative environmental information. This is usually justified by (legitimate or artificial) objections to 
quantitative CR reporting, alleged hurdles being complexity, immeasurability, immateriality and subjectivity of 
the CR aspects and processes, and the possible negative impact on the competitive position (Günther, Beyer, & 
Menninger, 2005). However, if a company makes true and faithful efforts with respect to CR aspects and follows 
a genuine legitimacy strategy, it will install structures and processes to support the accomplishment of CR 
objectives. Targets have to be established (according to societal expectations or better) and progress has to be 
measured against these targets, in order to implement effective and efficient management of sustainability and 
CR. According to the general essentials of operational management, actual implementation of a sustainability 
strategy would be hard to manage without quantitative data. The numbers tell the tale. The perception of true 
CR commitment is strongly supported by the presence of actual arrangements and provisions (like an 
environmental management system) to implement CR management. And such arrangements and provisions 
imply the existence and availability of quantitative information, largely eliminating the complexity and 
immeasurability arguments for non-disclosure. The materiality and subjectivity of CR disclosures are not for the 
company to be judged, since legitimacy requires the CR reporting to be judged by the stakeholders representing 
society (an argument that is arguably supported by the notion of quality, as demonstrated earlier). Finally, with 
respect to the possible negative impact on competitive position, although mimetic patterns may appear to be 
stronger for quantitative-monetary CR reporting than for indicative or descriptive contents (Aerts, Cormier, & 
Magnan, 2006), Toms (2002) makes a strong case against this argument: "… accounting disclosure is an important 
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conduit for signalling facts about environmental management. Also, as far as accounting disclosures accurately 
respond to reality, reputation is governed by the implementation and monitoring of environmental strategies. 
Because disclosure of performance against quantitative targets is difficult to imitate by companies not genuinely 
committed to environmental good practice, the information quality of such disclosures is high" (Toms, 2002, p. 
276), as also pointed out by Clarkson et al. (2011) (see p. 16). Ahmad and Mohamad (2014) provide an adequate 
and gripping summary: "We argue that if companies are concerned about accountability, then these companies 
will provide environmental information in all important areas of environmental performance, within their annual 
reports. …. Finally, companies will report more quantitative than qualitative information in line with Al-Tuwaijiri, 
et al.’s argument (2004, p. 454): ‘... quantitative disclosures are more objective and informative to stakeholders 
than qualitative information.’ Hence, an assessment of the extent and quality of environmental disclosures will 
help us to gain valuable insights into the critical issue of whether environmental disclosures discharge 
accountability" (Ahmad & Mohamad, 2014, p. 243). So it would appear that the objections to quantitative 
reporting are at least partly of a superficial nature, possibly prompted by resilience to actual sustainability efforts 
and costs, and signaling a particular perspective on corporate responsibility. 
It should be emphasized that it is not advocated here to restrict the CR disclosure to quantitative information, but 
only urged on the presence of quantitative information, which should also be accompanied by qualitative 
narratives (Sarfaty, 2013). But the provision of quantitative information in CR disclosures will positively influence 
various quality attributes of the disclosures: comparability, clarity and verifiability would be enhanced, while a 
better verifiability also enables assessment of accuracy and reliability, contributing to the credibility of the 
voluntary CR disclosures. Therefore, the provision of quantitative information in voluntary CR disclosures can be 
claimed to act as a proxy for the quality of CR disclosures. A binary assessment of disclosure elements will result 
in a relatively simple and straightforward content analysis procedure, easily to be executed and reproduced, 
without requiring expert contribution. Still it may provide an apt image of disclosure quality, to be related to the 
underlying motives and intentions for voluntary CR disclosure. It should be noted however, that the provision of 
quantitative information does not capture the complete notion of disclosure quality: balance, timeliness and 
appropriateness are not noticeably associated with the provision of quantitative information. Like qualitative 
narratives, quantitative information may, however comparable, clear, understandable, verifiable, accurate and 
reliable, be still imbalanced, too late and irrelevant. Another limitation is not making a distinction between 
monetary and non-monetary quantitative information. We assume that, although monetary information has the 
advantage of making it accessible and perceivable to financial analysts and investors, any quantitative 
information is associated with genuine intentions to inform society and its representing stakeholders. Qualitative, 
self-laudatory disclosures (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Bhattacharyya, 2014) are, however eloquently phrased, of 
limited credibility because they lack substantiation and limited informative value for stakeholders. 
2.4. Socio-political theories and hypotheses 
Legitimacy theory implies that firms facing greater exposure and causing a larger environmental burden would be 
inclined to provide more positive environmental disclosures in attempting to address threats to their legitimacy 
(Cho & Patten, 2007). It follows that legitimacy theory of social disclosure suggests the extent of social and 
environmental disclosure to be a function of exposure to public pressure in the social-political environment 
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(Ortas, Gallego-Alvarez, & Álvarez Etxeberria, 2015). From the premises of legitimacy theory and previous 
research studies, possible determinants of the quality of voluntary are procured. 
Firm size is the determinant most commonly found to be related to voluntary CR disclosure (e.g. Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2008; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Herbohn, Walker, & Loo, 2014), although the underlying reasons for its 
influence are not conclusively determined (Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2006) and not all CR disclosure studies 
have supported a size-disclosure relationship (Bhattacharyya, 2014). One often proposed reason is the external 
pressure associated with firm size (e.g. Toms, 2002). Within the legitimacy theory perspective, firm size is 
considered to be a proxy of higher social visibility, explaining variations in CR disclosure (Mahadeo, Oogarah-
Hanuman, & Soobaroyen, 2011). Bigger firms can be assumed to have a larger impact on the environment, and 
therefore to be more closely monitored by stakeholders and society, stressing their need to manage legitimacy. 
Thus, firm size is expected to influence the quality of voluntary CR disclosure. Within the selection of firms there 
may be differences in visibility and subsequent legitimacy demands due to the firm's size: 
H1. The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly positively associated with firm size. 
Industry affiliation is also assumed to be a facet of social visibility and thus influencing CR disclosures. Society's 
perception of the CR reporting necessity may vary over industrial branches, influencing the firms' perceived urge 
to report. For firms in industrial sectors with a significant intrinsic polluting potential, their inherent higher 
environmental impact will unavoidably result in a more negative perception and subsequent close monitoring by 
society and its stakeholders. High-impact firms are thus more liable to find their legitimacy challenged, and may 
feel more pressure to address their legitimacy by environmental disclosures. Such firms can be expected to 
report quantitatively if their legitimacy strategy is (pro)active and positive results can be presented to their 
stakeholders; if not, and quantitative information could deter their legitimacy, they may be expected to confine 
their disclosures to qualitative narratives. Firms generally will be inclined to hide non-favorable information. 
H2. The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly associated with industry affiliation. 
As an addition to this hypothesis, firms in low-impact and high-impact industrial sectors could be expected to 
show different behavior with respect to environmental disclosures. 
Our operationalization of legitimacy theory will now differentiate from previously conducted CR disclosure 
research. Whether firms actually do disclose quantitative environmental information depends on their adopted 
legitimacy strategy. According to Lindblom (1994), an organization may employ the following ‘legitimating’ 
strategies: 
1. change its output, methods or goals to conform with the expectations of its relevant publics, and then inform 
these relevant publics of the change; 
2. not change its output, methods or goals, but demonstrate the appropriateness of its output, methods or 
goals through education and information; 
3. try to alter the perceptions of relevant publics by associating itself with symbols that have a high legitimate 
status; 
4. try to alter societal expectations by aligning them with the organization's output, goals or methods. 
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Whereas previous studies have restricted legitimacy theory to be represented by the 3
rd
 strategy only, assuming 
opportunistic behavior, we will allow for all these legitimacy strategies to be pursued by firms. To avoid losing 
their legitimacy, firms may also be motivated to be more transparent and disclose the effects of their activities to 
their stakeholders (Cho & Patten, 2007). Whereas the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 legitimacy strategies can be labeled as being 
sincere strategies to obtain or maintain legitimacy, they will involve honest reporting, most probably by providing 
quantitative information to convince "the relevant publics". Numbers will tell the tale, and providing untruthful 
quantitative figures will not be an attractive line of conduct, in view of possible consequences of discovery. 
Consequently, quantitative reporting is assumed to be an indicator for sincere CR reporting, following a strategy 
in pursue of genuine legitimacy, as expressed by strategies 1 and 2. Strategy 3 aims at altering perceptions of 
legitimacy, avoiding the pursuit of genuine and well-founded legitimacy (the common operationalization of 
legitimacy theory). The absence of quantitative information will be assumed to be an indicator for strategy 3 
(avoidance). With respect to the 4
th
 strategy, aligning societal expectations with its own actual performance (e.g. 
by lobbying) is of limited feasibility; however the longitudinal study allows to identify firms reducing their 
voluntary CR reporting extensiveness, which may be perceived as defiance of the societal expectations and thus 
implying strategy 4. And although Bouten, Everaert, and Roberts (2012) have suggested "the failure to distinguish 
between the decision to disclose and the decision of how much to disclose" to be a reason for the inconsistencies 
and contradictories in empirical results of the studies to explain CR reporting, we will assume both decisions to 
be part of one integral legitimacy strategy, having the same underlying motives. These motives will originate 
from the firm's perception of its societal responsibilities. Bouten et al. (2012) based their distinction between the 
decision to disclose and the disclosure level primarily on former empirical statistics and did not sufficiently clarify 
the suggested underlying mechanisms that would support their distinction. So no disclosure arguably can be 
considered to be a disclosure level, in fact the lowest level possible. From a legitimacy perspective, no disclosure 
could be regarded as complete negligence of the expectations and concerns of the stakeholders and society. 
Legitimacy theory would predict CR disclosure for any firm adopting a legitimacy strategy (Van der Laan, 2009). 
Consequently, absence of CR disclosure is assumed to indicate the absence of a legitimacy strategy. In this case, 
external pressures would not be strong enough to convince the firm's management of the necessity to pursue 
legitimacy (and consequently disclose CR information), possibly because the firm's management does not 
consider the firm's legitimacy to be an issue; inhibiting forces to CR disclosure may be rooted in economic 
considerations. To determine the firms' actual legitimacy strategy, the provision of quantitative information will 
distinguish between Lindblom's (1994) 3
rd
 legitimacy strategy (no quantitative disclosure) and the other possible 
strategies. The initiation of discussions regarding the expectations of society in the CR narratives may distinguish 
the 4
th
 strategy (attempting to alter societal expectations and values). Although this approach may be sincere 
enough, being a rather defensive approach, it will not be received with much exuberance by society and 
government. Regarding its limited feasibility, this strategy is not expected to be frequently chosen. The CR 
narratives may also help to distinguish between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 legitimacy strategy, involving respectively actual 
improvement efforts or explanations and justifications only. However, both strategies involve transparency and 
indicate a positive sense of corporate responsibility and accountability. 
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Our approach is condensed in the following legitimacy flowchart: 
 Fig. 1. Legitimacy flowchart: corporate disclosure indicating possible underlying legitimacy strategies. 
 
The choice of legitimacy strategy is a corporate decision, ultimately made by the firm's executive manager. 
Consequently an association is assumed between the manager's attitude and perceptions towards corporate 
responsibility, as acquired from theoretical perspectives and experiences: managers with a predisposition for 
classical economical theories and only striving for maximal shareholders' value will be more inclined (have less 
inhibition) towards the self-fulfilling prophecy of economic theories, predicting opportunistic behavior. Executive 
managers with a more positive disposition towards legitimacy and corporate social responsibility are expected to 
endorse a more genuine legitimacy strategy, which will be expressed in the firm's voluntary CR disclosure. As 
demonstrated and explained earlier, the managers' characteristics age and compensation may be expected to be 
associated with their values, perceptions and predispositions, contributing to strategic (CR) choices, for which 
perceivable characteristics may serve as proxies. This will be revealed by an association between the managers' 
characteristics age and compensation and the chosen legitimacy strategy as indicated by the quality of CR 
disclosure (i.e. quantitative information). The subsequent hypotheses are: 
H3. The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly negatively associated with managers' age. 
H4. The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly negatively associated with managers' 
 compensation. 
Following earlier research (e.g. Fabrizi et al. (2014)), the distinct elements of the CEO's remuneration, i.e. base 
salary, short-term incentives and long-term-incentives, will be distinguished, since these elements may have 
different intentions and consequences for CEO behavior.  
As also often studied and determined, the presence and independence of a board of directors can be expected to 
relate to the quality of voluntary CR disclosure, the board being an effective instrument for corporate 
governance. Corporate governance mechanisms are found to play an important role in good practices of 
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corporate social responsibility (Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2013). As explained before, 
the board is expected to influence the corporate decisions taken by the executive manager. Consequently, the 
board independence is assumed to moderate the association between the manager's characteristics and the 
voluntary CR disclosure quality. 
H5. Board independence moderates the association between manager characteristics and voluntary 
 disclosure quality. 
With respect to CR disclosures, the investigation will be limited to environmental (i.e. ecological) information. 
Future research could easily be expanded to the other CR elements (for example using the GRI standard to 
identify all relevant areas of concern). Referring to Gray, Javad, Power, & Sinclair (2001), indicating the possible 
need for systematic longitudinal analysis of corporate disclosure and characteristics, as relationships may only be 
revealed over time, data will be collected over the period 2011-2015, to facilitate a longitudinal investigation. As 
explained previously, the provision of quantitative information will be adopted as a proxy for the quality of 
voluntary CR disclosure, which is associated with various quality attributes of the disclosure, and also 
distinguishes (at least to some extent) between genuine firms and disguising firms (consistent with attributing 
this advantage to the index of Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari (2008) based on the presence of quantitative 
information (Bachoo, Tan, & Wilson (2013)). 
One prediction can be made a priori: legitimacy theory will be supported by any evidence from empirical results 
because adequate voluntary disclosure from our point of view does NOT invalidate legitimacy theory. However, 
the adoption of the distinct legitimacy strategies, signaling a certain predisposition towards CR, will have to be 
shown by the evidence. It is intended to show whether the legitimacy, as perceived by the stakeholders, is 
genuinely based on adherence to societal values and norms and sincere commitment, or just unfounded rhetoric 
as an expression of impression or reputation management (fitting in the traditional economic perspective). 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Sample and data 
The firms selected were listed in the primary Dutch stock market indices AEX (Amsterdam Exchange Index) and 
AMX (Amsterdam Midkap Index) on July 12
th
 2016, representing the largest and most frequently traded shares 
(highest share turnover) of the Amsterdam stock market (at that moment). This selection also implies the largest 
firm (fair) value and size. The selection thus comprises of 50 firms, for which their annual reports of the period 
2011-2015 are collected from their publicly accessible websites. If separate sustainability or CR reports are 
presented, these will be considered to represent the voluntary CR disclosure and consequently taken into the 
assessment. Otherwise, the voluntary sustainability information is assumed to be provided by the annual report, 
e.g. in case of integrated (or "Triple Bottom Line") reporting. The period of five years should sufficiently allow for 
a longitudinal investigation. The collected reports will be the primary source of the required information for 
content analysis. The content analysis is rather simple and straightforward, limited to the dichotomous 
classification of the presence (or absence) of quantitative information on ecological aspects as recognized by the 
GRI's G4 standard (GRI, 2013).  
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3.2. Model, variables and methods 
Based on the developed hypotheses, the conceptual model for this research study can be presented: 
Fig. 2. Conceptual representation: associations with voluntary CR disclosure quality. 
 
 
The dependent variable, representing the quality of voluntary CR disclosure, is determined by content analysis, 
based on the GRI's G4 standard. This standard identifies the following environmental aspects: materials, energy, 
water, biodiversity, emissions, effluents and waste, products and services, compliance, transport, overall, 
supplier environmental assessment and environmental grievance mechanisms. The standard states: "The 
environmental dimension of sustainability concerns the organization’s impact on living and non-living natural 
systems, including land, air, water and ecosystems. The Environmental Category covers impacts related to inputs 
(such as energy and water) and outputs (such as emissions, effluents and waste). In addition, it covers 
biodiversity, transport, and product and service-related impacts, as well as environmental compliance and 
expenditures." (GRI, 2013), and proposes indicators to provide information on (a.o.) the environmental 
performance or impacts of an organization related to its material aspects (i.e. those that reflect the 
organization’s significant environmental impacts or substantively influence the assessments and decisions of 
stakeholders). In the category "Environmental", 34 distinct indicators are nominated for the aspects "materials" 
(2), "energy" (5), "water" (3), "biodiversity" (4), "emissions" (7), "effluents and waste" (5), "products and services" 
(2), "compliance" (1), "transport" (1), "overall" (1), "supplier environmental assessment" (2) and "environmental 
grievance mechanisms" (1). Obviously, in an ideal situation, a company would adhere perfectly to all criteria of 
the G4 standard, producing perfect CR and environmental disclosures and providing all relevant information to 
stakeholders. Since this study is aiming at environmental disclosure quality related to a firm's social responsibility 
perception and resulting legitimacy strategy, assuming this quality to be primarily determined by quantitative 
information, several G4 criteria are omitted in the analysis. Although these criteria are certainly of importance as 
well, they do not serve the purposes of this study. Some aspects' indicators are aimed at discretionary business 
processes, policies and internal measures, and only indirectly contribute to the organization's environmental 
impact. These will therefore be excluded from the analysis (not withstanding their obvious importance for 
corporate environmental care). Some criteria are omitted since other criteria are assumed to be sufficient 
indicators for genuine environmental care. This leaves only the aspects with a direct and substantial impact on 
the environment, and eligible for clear and attributable quantitative reporting (according to the GRI guidelines). 
The remaining criteria are shown in table 1. 
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Table 1. Selected G4 criteria: environmental aspects to be quantitatively reported. 
Materials G4-EN1 Total weight or volume of (renewable and non-renewable) materials that are used to 
produce and package the organization’s primary products and services. 
G4-EN2 The percentage of recycled input materials used to manufacture the organization’s primary 
products and services. 
Energy G4-EN3 Total energy consumption in joules or multiples. 
G4-EN6 The amount of reductions in energy consumption achieved as a direct result of conservation 
and efficiency initiatives. 
Water G4-EN8 Total volume of water withdrawn from surface water/groundwater/rainwater/waste 
water/municipal water supplies or other water utilities 
G4-EN10 Total volume of water recycled and reused by the organization. 
Emissions G4-EN15 Gross direct GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2 equivalent, independent of any GHG trades 
(such as purchases, sales, or transfers of offsets or allowances). 
G4-EN16 Gross energy indirect GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2 equivalent. 
G4-EN19 The amount of GHG emissions reductions achieved as a direct result of initiatives to reduce 
emissions, in metric tons of CO2 equivalent. 
G4-EN20 Production, imports, and exports of ODS in metric tons of CFC-11 equivalent. 
G4-EN21 The amount of significant air emissions, in kilograms or multiples for NOx/SOx/POP/VOC/ 
HAP/PM/other standard categories of air emissions identified in relevant regulations. 
Effluents and 
Waste 
G4-EN22 Total volume of planned and unplanned water discharges (destination/quality of the water 
including treatment method/whether it was reused by another organization) 
G4-EN23 Total weight of hazardous and non-hazardous waste, by the various disposal methods. 
G4-EN24 The total number and total volume of recorded significant spills. 
Products and 
services 
G4-EN27 The extent to which environmental impacts of products and services have been mitigated 
during the reporting period. 
Transport G4-EN30 Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods and materials 
for the organization’s operations, and transporting members of the workforce. 
Overall G4-EN31 Total environmental protection expenditures by: waste disposal, emissions treatment, and 
remediation costs; Prevention and environmental management costs 
Environmental 
grievance 
mechanisms 
G4-EN34 The total number of grievances about environmental impacts filed through formal grievance 
mechanisms. 
Based on the absence or presence of quantitative information, these aspects will be valued either 0 (no 
compliant quantitative information provided) or 1 (quantitative information presented). Provided quantities 
should be, or could be deducted to, an absolute value (verifiability and comparability should fundamentally be 
attainable). An adequately explained and justified declaration of non-relevance or absence of the requested item 
is also valued as a positive occurrence. Consequently, the total environmental disclosure quality will be scored 0 
to 18. Obviously, a more extensive and complex (or even completely "GRI conformant") index could be 
developed, to include all indicators of all aspects of all categories of the GRI's standard. This study however will 
be limited to the indicated selection of aspects, whereas the primary objective is to demonstrate the signaling 
value of quantitative information regarding the quality of voluntary CR disclosure. Using the legitimacy flowchart, 
the firm's probable legitimacy strategy can be deducted from the resulting voluntary CR disclosure quality. This is 
based on the assumption that some of the criteria (i.e. G4-EN2, G4-EN6, G4-EN10, G4-EN19, G4-EN27, G4-EN34) 
imply a (pro)active attitude towards environmental care (legitimacy strategy 1), over a strict conformant attitude 
(legitimacy strategy 2), since these criteria emphatically and unambiguously express improvement efforts (e.g. 
recycling, reuse, reduction and mitigation). So from the reporting items, 2 variables are deducted: TotalRep (sum 
of all reported items) and ActiveRep (sum of reported items that may be considered to indicate a proactive 
environmental policy). Besides these variables, a legitimacy strategy indicator was deducted from the reported 
items (LegStrat), according to the classification of Lindblom (1994) and the legitimacy flowchart. Since the 
legitimacy strategies are not in some particular order, the legitimacy strategy cannot be correlated with 
independent variables directly to reveal their association. To envisage regression analysis for the legitimacy 
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strategy, these are ranked according to their supposed degree of genuine corporate social responsibility 
(LegRank), i.e. legitimacy strategies 0, 3, 4, 2 and 1 are assigned a value of 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
The legitimacy strategy (Legstrat) is considered to be a mediating variable in this study, deducted from and 
therefore strongly associated with the degree and character of quantitative environmental disclosure. It has been 
introduced primarily for explanatory purposes with respect to the elaboration and operationalization of the 
legitimacy theory, as a conceptual mechanism leading to voluntary CR disclosure. One could also have assumed 
CR disclosure quality to be directly dependent on the independent variables. 
Table 2. Dependent and mediating variables 
Variable Description Range 
TotalRep Sum of all reported items 0-18 
ActiveRep Sum of reported items indicating a proactive environmental policy 0-6 
LegStrat Legitimacy strategy (deducted from environmental reporting behavior) 0,1,2,3,4 
LegRank Ranked legitimacy strategy (in order of societal desirability) 0-4 
The independent variables are the supposed determinants of voluntary CR disclosure quality. The influence of 
firm size is usually explained by the association with the firm's visibility and societal consequences of the firm's 
operations, invoking societal pressures. Firm size is determined by the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, 
as usually applied in previous research on voluntary CR disclosure; the firm's total assets will be provided by the 
firm's annual report. Industrial branch will be determined using the first level of the Dutch standard company 
classification (SBI), which is based on both the standard EU and UN classifications NACE and ISIC, distinguishing 
21 industrial sectors. These sectors will subsequently be distinguished in high-impact and low-impact industries, 
following the dichotomous yes/no coding scheme as adopted by Cho and Patten (2007) to distinguish 
environmentally sensitive industries: the categories "oil exploration", "paper", "chemical and allied products", 
"petroleum refining", "metals", "mining" and "utilities" are designated to be environmentally high-impact 
industries, while all other represented categories are designated to be relatively low-impact industries. The 
attributes of the firm's executive manager to be determined are age and compensation. The manager's age will 
be determined at the firm's reporting date, if the date of birth can be found on the Internet. The manager's 
compensation will be directly deducted from the annual report.  
Table 3. Independent variables 
Variable  Description 
Ln(TA) = Natural logarithm of Total Assets of a firm, to represent the firm's size 
Industry = Industrial sector to which the firm belongs 
IndImp = 1 if Industrial sector is (environmental) high-impact industry; 0 otherwise (low-impact) 
Age = The age of the firm's CEO in the year of reporting 
Total compensation = The total annual remuneration of the firm's CEO in the year of reporting, calculated 
from the sum of (base) Salary, STI (short-term incentives) and LTI (long-term incentives) 
The moderating variable board independence will be represented by the absolute number of independent (non-
executive) board members, also to be deducted from the annual report. 
The model used for ordinary least-square (OLS) multiple regression analysis can be summarized as: 
  Quantitative reportingi = ƒ(CEO characteristics, Firm size, industrial environmental impact), (i = 1…,231) (1) 
Nested regressions are specified, subsequently adding independent variables in models A and B. 
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4. Results, analyses and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables (5-year sample) 
Panel A: continuous independent and moderating variables 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
Firm size (Ln(Total Assets)) 236 18,8973 27,8773 22,7584 1,9271 
CEO age 236 36 72 53,60 6,09 
CEO total compensation 231 200.000 9.119.864 2.549.484 2.030.857 
Base salary 231 94.608 4.081.000 1.044.598 587.975 
STI (short-term incentives) 231 0 3.500.000 590.040 685.051 
LTI (long-term incentives) 231 0 7.775.000 914.845 1.213.251 
Board independence 236 0 15 6,63 2,31 
Panel B: dichotomous independent variable 
Variable N 0 Frequency % 1 Frequency % 
IndImp (environmental Impact) 236 low 164 69,5 high 72 30,5 
Panel C: GRI reporting item variables 
Variable N 0 Frequency % 1 Frequency % 
EN1 (materials usage) 236 No 180 76,3 Yes 56 23,7 
EN2 (materials recycled) 236  196 83,1  40 16,9 
EN3 (energy consumption) 236  100 42,4  136 57,6 
EN6 (energy consumption reductions) 236  198 83,9  38 16,1 
EN8 (water withdrawal) 236  119 50,4  117 49,6 
EN10 (water recycling/reuse) 236  230 97,5  6 2,5 
EN15 (direct GHG emissions) 236  84 35,6  152 64,4 
EN16 (indirect GHG emissions) 236  115 48,7  121 51,3 
EN19 (GHG emissions reduction) 236  200 84,7  36 15,3 
EN20 (ODS production) 236  200 84,7  36 15,3 
EN21 (air emissions) 236  184 78,0  52 22,0 
EN22 (water discharges) 236  199 84,3  37 15,7 
EN23 (waste) 236  123 52,1  113 47,9 
EN24 (spills) 236  195 82,6  41 17,4 
EN27 (env. impact mitigation) 236  209 88,6  27 11,4 
EN30 (transport env. impact) 236  162 68,6  74 31,4 
EN31 (env. protection expenditures) 236  225 95,3  11 4,7 
EN34 (grievances) 236  219 92,8  17 7,2 
 Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha based on 
standardized items 
N of items 
 0,877 0,869 18 
Panel D: dependent variables 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
TotalRep 236 0 17 4,70 4,07 
ActiveRep 236 0 5 0,62 1,12 
LegRank 236 0 4 2,35 1,26 
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Annual reports were collected for all 50 firms, of 2011 to 2015. Due to earlier non-existence, for 2 firms only the 
2015 annual report was publicly available and for another 2 firms only the 2014 and 2015 annual reports were 
available. One firm did not expose CEO remuneration data in any annual report. In the 5-year period, 21 times a 
new CEO was appointed. While the average total assets of the sample declined with 20%, the CEOs' average total 
compensation increased with 47%, resulting in an average CEO compensation of € 3.132.315 in 2015. The CEOs' 
average age is approximately 54, with little variance (coefficient of variation equals 0,11). With respect to the 
boards, in the Dutch environment a two-tier board structure is customary (78% of the sample), allowing the 
supervisory board members to be assumed independent. Where firms possess a one-tier board structure, the 
independent directors are explicitly identified. 
As also concluded by KPMG (2015), this analysis reveals that CR reporting is susceptible for improvement when 
considering quantitative reporting as a measure for reporting quality. Quantitative item reporting has increased 
from 21% in 2011 to only 30% in 2015. Quantitative reporting on GHG (CO2) emissions (64%), energy 
consumption (58%), water withdrawal (50%) and waste disposal (48%) is relatively commonplace, while water 
recycling (3%), environmental expenditures (5%) and environmental grievances (7%) are hardly ever reported. 
With an overall quantitative reporting of 26% of the selected GRI items during this period of 5 years, this may be 
considered to be a rather disappointing outcome of the general reporting on the environmental burden of firms. 
Table 5. Legitimacy strategies of sample firms 
Legitimacy strategy Value Frequency %  
no strategy 0 26 11,0  
(pro)active strategy 1 35 14,8  
compliant strategy 2 112 47,5  
perception management 3 48 20,3  
expectations management 4 15 6,4  
Total  236 100,0  
The adopted legitimacy strategy, as deducted from the voluntary environmental disclosures, appears to be most 
often a compliant strategy or (pro)active strategy, but some firms have reduced their quantitative reporting 
(assumed to indicate expectations management). Over 20% of the firms only present environmental narratives 
(perception management), while 11% of the firms do not express any environmental responsibility at all in their 
annual reporting. 
4.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 6 presents the individual associations between the dependent and independent variables, showing that the 
degree of quantitative environmental reporting (and thus the quality of voluntary CR disclosure) is associated 
with firm size, supporting our hypothesis H1. Also this univariate analysis shows that the ranked legitimacy 
strategy is associated with firm size. The high or low environmental impact of the industry appears to be 
significantly associated with quantitative environmental reporting. To assess the relation between industry 
affiliation and voluntary environmental disclosure quality, an analysis of variance reveals that only 11,7% of the 
variance in the ranked legitimacy strategy is explained by the industry class, while the industry class explains 
11,8% of the total reporting variance (table 7). This supports our hypothesis H2 that the quality of voluntary 
(environmental) CR disclosure is associated with the firms' industry affiliation (although not very profoundly). 
29 
 
Table 6. Correlations between independent, mediating, moderating and dependent variables 
Variable Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Firm size I 1           
2 IndImp I -,029 1          
3 CEO Age I ,236** ,130* 1         
4 CEO Comp. I ,318** ,031 ,090 1        
5 - Base I ,574** ,026 ,105 ,728** 1       
6 - STI I ,328** ,124 ,053 ,753** ,455** 1      
7 - LTI I ,068 -,030 ,069 ,896** ,477** ,475** 1     
8 Board I ,676** -,074 ,263** ,468** ,510** ,428** ,295** 1    
9 TotalRep D ,435** ,130* ,159* ,324** ,364** ,268** ,215** ,394** 1   
10 ActiveRep D ,242** -,007 ,034 ,311** ,274** ,239** ,254** ,270** ,727** 1  
11 LegRank D ,341** ,197** ,150* ,200** ,276** ,157* ,113 ,324** ,842** ,588** 1 
Pearson correlations are tabulated; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 7. Analysis of Variance and measures of association for industry and dependent variables 
 Sum of squares df Mean Square F p Eta
2
 
TotalRep*Industry Between groups 460,822 9 51,202 3,373 ,001 ,118 
Within groups 3430,415 226 15,179    
Total 3891,237 235     
LegRank*Industry Between groups 43,823 9 4,869 3,318 ,001 ,117 
Within groups 331,685 226 1,468    
Total 375,508 235     
With respect to the CEO's characteristics, table 6 also illustrates that the CEO's age and total remuneration 
appear to be (moderately but significantly) positively associated with quantitative environmental reporting. A 
negative association between the CEO's age and remuneration and the quality of environmental disclosure, 
based on the premise of an economical perspective above societal responsibilities, if existing, is not revealed by 
these outcomes. It is however possible that such an association is hidden by other, stronger relationships in the 
collected data. As has been noted, very little change in the CEO position can be observed, while the CEO's all get 
older in the 5-year period (and the variance in their age is low), and their remuneration increases, as well as their 
social perspective. These tendencies might well override any other association. This view is supported by 
examining the correlations for the subsequent years (not tabulated): the significance of the correlations 
disappears, while no prominent particularities can be observed. Also, the positive association between the CEOs' 
characteristics and quantitative reporting may be partially caused by the association between these variables and 
firm size. In any case, there is not any clue to be found for the presumed negative association of the CEO's 
characteristics with quantitative voluntary environmental reporting. Similar observations are made for the 
remuneration components, i.e. fixed salary, short-term incentives (STI) and long-term incentives (LTI): an overall 
significant positive association with quantitative environmental reporting, the significance fading when assessing 
subsequent years. The fixed salary part of the remuneration generally appears to be the strongest part of the 
positive association with quantitative environmental disclosure (which part obviously is more customary to 
increase steadily with the CEO's age compared to performance-depending incentives). Clearly, hypotheses H3 
and H4 are not confirmed by this univariate analysis. Board independence shows to be significantly associated 
with firm size, as well as with the mediating and dependent variable (see table 6). 
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4.3. Multivariate analysis 
Table 8 presents the multivariate results of the OLS regression analysis for the model specified in Eq. 1. 
Table 8. OLS regression results for total amount of quantitative environmental reporting  
Variables 
TotalRep (total quantitative environmental reporting) 
Model A Model B 
CEO age ,125* (2,005) ,033 (,546) 
CEO total remuneration ,313** (5,020) ,200* (3,279)  
Firm size (Ln(Total Assets))  ,371** (5,925) 
Industrial env. impact (hi/lo)  ,114 (1,960) 
R
2
 ,121 ,246 
Adjusted R
2
 ,113 ,233 
∆ R
2
  ,126 
F 15,637** 18,479** 
N 231 231 
Standardized coefficients are reported with t-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
According to the F-statistics, both models are significant. Whereas model A (CEO characteristics) explains 
approximately 12% of the variance in quantitative reporting, model B (including firm size and industrial 
environmental impact) explains over 24% of the variance in quantitative reporting, mainly attributable to firm 
size while the industry's environmental impact does not appear to play a very significant role in our sample. The 
coefficient of the CEO's remuneration remains significant, while the CEO age coefficient drops to insignificance. 
This confirms the earlier observations from univariate analysis (and hypothesis H1): firm size is significantly 
associated with the quantitative quality of environmental disclosure. Whereas industry affiliation was found to be 
significantly associated with the quantitative quality of environmental disclosure by an analysis of variance, the 
high or low environmental impact of the firm's industry does not appear to be of significant importance. 
To test the expected moderating effect of board independence on the association between the CEO's 
remuneration and quantitative environmental disclosure, we use moderation variables, calculated by 
multiplication of the standardized independent and moderating variables, for subsequent regressions, described 
by: 
  Quantitative reportingi = ƒ(CEO variables, firm size, industrial env. impact, moderating variables, year) (2) 
The results of the moderation tests (table 9) confirm the earlier observations from univariate analysis: for both 
the CEO's age and total remuneration there appears to be an interaction with the board's independence (i.e. the 
number of independent board members) in their association with quantitative environmental reporting. 
Although the effect of the CEO's age is not significant, it still appears to be moderated by the board's 
independence: adding the moderator variable adds over 6% to the explanatory power of the model while the 
influence of the firm's size increases. The influence of the board's independence on the association between 
CEO's remuneration and quantitative disclosure appears to be significantly strong as well. Therefore, our 
hypothesis H5 concerning the moderating role of board independence appears to be confirmed. With respect to 
our hypotheses, this OLS regression with all variables, including the reporting year, shows that quantitative 
environmental disclosure (H1) is positively associated with firm size; (H2) is not significantly associated with 
industry's environmental impact; (H3) is not significantly (negatively) associated with CEOs' age; (H4) is 
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significantly positively (instead of negatively) associated with CEOs' remuneration; and (H5) the association with 
the CEOs' characteristics is moderated by the board's independence. 
Table 9. OLS regression results with board independence as moderation variable 
Variables 
TotalRep (total quantitative environmental reporting) 
Model B_1 Model B_2A Model B_2B Model B_2C Model B_3 
CEO age ,033 (,546) -,024 (-,402) -,007 (-,119) -,031 (-,525) -,032 (-,539) 
CEO total remuneration ,200* (3,279)  ,169* (2,689) ,635** (3,711) ,448* (2,564) ,415* (2,379) 
Firm size (Ln(TA)) ,371** (5,925) ,392** (4,971) ,243* (3,073) ,349** (4,229) ,339** (4,137) 
Industrial env. impact ,114 (1,960) ,088 (1,552) ,109 (1,908) ,085 (1,515) ,088 (1,580) 
Moderation 
Board independence  ,028 (,320)  ,382* (3,282) ,186 (1,471) ,211 (1,674) 
Agest*Board independencest  -,262** (-4,367)  -,226** (-3,567) -,217* (-3,448) 
Tot_remunst*Board indep.st   -,622* (-2,994) -,367 (-1,711) -,363 (-1,704) 
Control      
Year     ,119* (2,108) 
      
R
2
 ,246 ,314 ,284 ,323 ,336 
Adjusted R
2
 ,233 ,295 ,265 ,301 ,312 
∆ R
2
  ,067 (B_1) ,038 (B_1) ,076 (B_1) ,013 
F 18,479** 17,078** 14,816** 15,182** 14,045** 
N 231 231 231 231 231 
Standardized coefficients are reported with t-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
Table 9 also reveals a significant positive association between quantitative environmental reporting and the 
reporting year; the year variable does add some marginal explanatory power to the regression model (+ 1,3%) 
but no interaction with the CEO's characteristics is found to be of significance to the degree of quantitative 
environmental reporting. However, the suspicion that the longitudinal nature of the sample data may interfere 
with certain variable associations, calls for further investigation of the influence of the elapse of time in the data. 
Table 10. Correlations between time (year) and model variables 
Variables Firm size CEO age CEO remuneration TotalRep 
Year ,010 -,010 ,183** ,154* 
Pearson correlations are tabulated; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
Both the CEO's remuneration and the degree of quantitative environmental reporting appear to show some 
association with the elapse of time, while firm size and CEO's age do not. Obviously, the industrial sector (not 
tabulated) and its environmental impact remain the same for the selected companies during the period of 5 
years. 
An influence of time may be further revealed by splitting the sample according to subsequent years. Table 11 
shows that the association of firm size with all other variables is ultimately decreasing during the 5-year period. 
The CEO's age does not show any significant association with the dependent variable, while the CEO's 
remuneration shows a significant association with the degree of quantitative environmental reporting. 
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Table 11. Annual correlations between independent and dependent variables 
 Variables Firm size Ind. impact CEO Age CEO Comp. 
2011 Industry env. impact -,043 1   
 CEO Age ,307* ,188 1  
 CEO Compensation ,356* -,001 ,005 1 
 TotalRep ,552** ,131 ,156 ,314* 
2012 Industry env. impact -,052 1   
 CEO Age ,423** ,038 1  
 CEO Compensation ,311* -,049 ,009 1 
 TotalRep ,469** ,104 ,175 ,304* 
2013 Industry env. impact -,005 1   
 CEO Age ,131 ,164 1  
 CEO Compensation ,382** ,091 ,176 1 
 TotalRep ,406** ,114 ,286 ,310* 
2014 Industry env. impact -,027 1   
 CEO Age ,113 ,122 1  
 CEO Compensation ,333* ,100 ,183 1 
 TotalRep ,410** ,127 ,110 ,367* 
2015 Industry env. impact -,019 1   
 CEO Age ,130 ,157 1  
 CEO Compensation ,268 ,001 ,109 1 
 TotalRep ,393** ,171 ,148 ,255 
Pearson correlations are tabulated; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
An OLS regression for subsequent years (table 12) shows that all models except one are significant at least at the 
5% level according to F-statistics. The explanatory power of the regression model with the selected independent 
variables is diminishing during the 5-year period, as well as the influence of firm size on quantitative 
environmental reporting. No other significant variable coefficients can be observed. When entering the 
moderation variable of CEO's age and board independence, this variable is significantly contributing to an 
improved explanatory power of the regression model while the influence of firm size appears to increase at first, 
but decreases later on (and overall decreasing in the course of time). When entering the moderation variable of 
CEO's remuneration and board independence, also the explanatory power of the regression model increases, 
particularly contributed to by the CEO's remuneration and board independence, both gaining some significance. 
These results confirm the moderating role of board independence on the association between the CEO's 
characteristics and quantitative environmental reporting. Also the fading influence of firm size is confirmed. The 
longitudinal assessment of the sample data does not reveal any other particularities. 
Table 12. OLS regression results for total amount of quantitative environmental reporting for subsequent years 
Panel A: independent variables only 
Variables 
TotalRep (total quantitative environmental reporting) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Firm size (Ln(TA)) ,544* (3,745) ,441* (2,760) ,322* (2,154) ,333* (2,327) ,348* (2,491) 
Ind. env. Impact ,123 (,949) ,110 (,814) ,075 (,540) ,097 (,714) ,158 (1,170) 
CEO age -,049 (-,353) -,031 (-,206) ,210 (1,494) ,013 (,097) ,059 (,430) 
CEO remuneration ,120 (,877) ,173 (1,199) ,144 (,955) ,243 (1,678) ,156 (1,117) 
R
2
 ,351 ,267 ,245 ,240 ,212 
Adjusted R
2
 ,286 ,193 ,170 ,168 ,141 
F 5,412* 3,638* 3,254* 3,318* 2,965* 
N 45 45 45 47 49 
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Table 12. OLS regression results for total amount of quantitative environmental reporting for subsequent years  (continued) 
Panel B: independent variables and moderating variable Agest*Board independencest 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Firm size (Ln(TA)) ,832* (3,500) ,703* (3,523) ,298 (1,493) ,257 (1,626) ,286 (1,852) 
Ind. env. Impact ,108 (,863) ,029 (,243) ,066 (,460) ,061 (,477) ,155 (1,207) 
CEO age -,167 (-1,180) -,088 (-,650) ,173 (1,152) -,192 (-1,381) -,105 (-,749) 
CEO remuneration ,093 (,638) ,064 (,448) ,176 (1,008) ,170 (1,120) ,130 (,955) 
Board independence -,295 (-1,136) -,128 (-,598) -,038 (-,146) ,254 (1,346) ,308 (1,791) 
Age*Board_indep -,396* (-2,292) -,532** (-4,011) -,148 (-,787) -,414* (-3,042) -,356* (-2,613) 
R
2
 ,432 ,490 ,260 ,407 ,349 
Adjusted R
2
 ,342 ,409 ,144 ,318 ,256 
∆ R
2
 ,081 ,223 ,015 ,167 ,137 
F 4,813* 6,076** 2,230 4,578* 3,751* 
N 45 45 45 47 49 
Panel C: independent variables and moderating variable Remunerationst*Board independencest 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Firm size (Ln(TA)) ,595* (3, 342) ,366 (1,725) ,208 (1,066) ,062 (,371) ,149 (,874) 
Ind. env. impact ,122 (1,041) ,096 (,699) ,052 (,376) ,079 (,618) ,202 (1,503) 
CEO age -,202 (-1,532) -,085 (-,529) ,200 (1,435) -,082 (-,621) -,037 (-,260) 
CEO remuneration 2,026* (3,433) ,833 (1,170) ,915 (1,910) 1,214* (2,916) ,590 (1,638) 
Board independence ,573*(2,383) ,342 (1,112) ,377 (1,421) ,872* (3,015) ,663 (1,971) 
Renum*Board_indep -2,306* (-3,361) -,840 (-1,023) -,963 (-1,748) -1,473* (-2,788) -,745 (-1,487) 
R
2
 ,501 ,293 ,304 ,389 ,281 
Adjusted R
2
 ,423 ,181 ,194 ,297 ,178 
∆ R
2
 ,150 ,026 ,059 ,149 ,069 
F 6,370** 2,625* 2,770* 4,239* 2,734* 
N 45 45 45 47 49 
Standardized coefficients are reported with t-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
Summarizing all statistical analyses, the following can be synthesized concerning our hypotheses: 
H1 The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly positively associated with firm size. Adopting 
quantitative environmental reporting as a measure for voluntary CR disclosure quality, our analyses 
confirm that it is positively associated with firm size. It should be noted however, that the longitudinal 
study reveals that this association is fading in magnitude and significance, becoming less eminent. 
H2 The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly associated with industry affiliation. Although an 
analysis of variance confirms a significant (but moderate) association and univariate analysis demonstrates 
a significant relation between the industries' environmental impact and quantitative environmental 
reporting, multivariate analysis does not confirm this association in any way. The nature and origins of the 
relationship between the industrial sector and quality of voluntary CR disclosure thus remain unclear. 
H3 The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly (negatively) associated with managers' age. Univariate 
analysis shows a significant (positive) association between quantitative environmental reporting and the 
CEOs' age (table 6) but this again is not confirmed by multivariate analysis, revealing no association at all. 
This hypothesis has to be discarded. 
H4 The quality of voluntary CR disclosure is significantly (negatively) associated with managers' compensation. 
This hypothesis is not confirmed by univariate analysis and (overall) multivariate analysis; no significant 
association is shown by the OLS regression for subsequent years, unless moderated by board 
independence. Thus this hypothesis also has to be discarded. 
H5 Board independence moderates the association between manager characteristics and voluntary disclosure 
quality. This hypothesis is clearly confirmed by the overall and annual OLS regression results. 
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5. Conclusions 
With respect to the central question of this paper, concerning the determinants of voluntary CR disclosure 
quality, the results of our investigations cannot be considered to be breaking news and our hypotheses are not 
undeniably confirmed at all. Still, some conclusions can be drawn from this research. First, we have found that 
voluntary CR disclosure quality, represented by quantitative environmental reporting, is associated with firm size, 
in accordance with most earlier research results. Our longitudinal approach reveals that this association is 
gradually fading, which may indicate that also smaller firms may increasingly feel the need to adequately report 
on CR matters. Second, the firm's industrial sector seems to be associated with quantitative environmental 
reporting, but this does not appear to originate from the industry's environmental impact. Why the industrial 
sector is relevant to voluntary CR disclosure needs further investigation. Third, departing from the supposedly 
contradictory views of traditional economics aiming at shareholder value maximization and legitimacy theory 
aiming at corporate responsibility, assumptions were made concerning the association between voluntary CR 
disclosure quality and CEO characteristics. Older and more generously compensated CEOs were expected to 
adhere to a more economical viewpoint on corporate responsibilities, less inclined to endorse environmental 
efforts, implying a negative association between quantitative environmental reporting and CEO characteristics 
age and remuneration. Our empirical results do not confirm these assumptions. The CEO's age does not appear 
to be of any significance for quantitative environmental reporting, while the CEO's remuneration shows a positive 
association with voluntary CR disclosure quality. Fourth, the assumption of board independence (represented by 
the number of independent board members) moderating the association between the CEO's characteristics and 
quantitative environmental reporting is definitely supported by our analyses. These observations may well 
indicate that voluntary CR disclosure is already established in business habits to such an extent, that the influence 
of formerly arguable determinants of voluntary disclosure is already outmoded. 
Quantitative environmental reporting as the dependent variable has turned out be quite informative with respect 
to the contemporary quality of voluntary CR disclosure. Whereas the 2015 KPMG survey on CR reporting (KPMG, 
2015) might offer the impression that Dutch firms exhibit reasonable socially responsible behavior, this study 
shows that the quality of CR reporting generally is still far from ideal: only approximately 30% of quantifiable 
environmental measures as demanded by GRI's G4 guidelines are reported as required. Without absolute and 
comprehensive quantification of the environmental burden, environmental reporting will remain vague, its 
credibility disputable and its informative value for CR and legitimacy assessment insufficient. The numbers tell 
the tale. Even if a positive legitimacy strategy is adopted, firms do not appear to quantitatively report on all 
environmental aspects. While corporate responsibility currently seems to be fairly established, firms still appear 
to be reluctant to provide hard figures on all environmental pressures. Research studies usually depart from the 
question why firms would voluntarily report on CR issues. Perhaps nowadays a better question would be why 
firms do NOT report quantitatively on corporate responsibility issues like its environmental burden.  
Perhaps the most important conclusion the be drawn from this study is in the questioning of the interpretation of 
legitimacy theory in the majority of prior research studies. An intrinsically inconsistent elaboration of the 
legitimacy principles may unavoidably lead to inconsistent and contradictory research outcomes. Therefore, this 
study has adopted a different implementation approach of the legitimacy theory, as expressed in the proposed 
legitimacy flowchart. If following the formerly generally adopted approach, only 20% of the sample firms using 
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legitimacy strategy 3 (attempting to establish a perception of environmental legitimacy without substantiation) 
would lead to the conclusion that legitimacy theory does not properly predict the empirical results of this study. 
From our elaboration of the legitimacy theory we can conclude that the legitimacy theory adequately supports 
the recognition of various legitimacy strategies. It shows that 62% of the firms has adopted a socially responsible 
and desirable environmental strategy. The choice for a strategy of avoidance and diversion or even completely 
neglecting environmental responsibilities is becoming less and less customary and is still declining, although at a 
disappointing rate. Another important conclusion concerns the central train of thought in this study: that the 
classical economic perspective, propagating shareholder value maximization, self-interest and abundant CEO 
remuneration, would be conflicting with a more socially responsible perspective, as possessed by the firm's CEO 
(being the primary decision-maker). Neither CEO age nor remuneration can be conclusively tied to quantitative 
environmental reporting or to the apparently adopted legitimacy strategy in the supposed way. It seems that all 
CEO's, regardless of their dominant perspective, are inclined to increasingly demonstrate socially responsible 
behavior. This observation confirms the postulate of Davis (1973), as cited by Manner (2010): "…If society moves 
toward norms of social responsibility as it is now doing, then the businessman is subtly and inevitably guided by 
these same norms…". As usually found by previous studies, voluntary environmental disclosure quality is found to 
be associated with the firms' size, but to a continuously diminishing extent, showing that formerly existing causes 
and effects may be disappearing along with changing perceptions of corporate responsibilities. 
Like any research study, this study is subject to certain limitations. First, the study is limited to firms listed in the 
Dutch stock market indices. Since the firm's country of origin is generally considered to be a significant 
determinant of voluntary CR disclosure (e.g. Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2013), results 
may not be expected to be representative of firms in other countries, with differing jurisdictions, cultures and 
values. The selection also implies relatively large companies, with an unavoidable high level of exposure. For 
SME's, other considerations may well be more appropriate; our theoretical exercises are probably limited to large 
corporations, with corresponding "heavy" executive managers. Second, the operationalization of the 
independent variables is open to discussion. Our literature review has shown a general and deserved concern 
with respect to the operationalization of variables (e.g. Bouten, Everaert, & Roberts (2012), and this theoretical 
exercise deserves careful consideration, as also indicated by Sutton and Staw (1995). With respect to the firm's 
executive manager's attitude and perceptions towards CR, as well as board independence, more suitable proxies 
are thinkable. However, these would be far more complex, and would ultimately require qualitative investigation 
(pointing to an area of further research). Third, the sample of 50 companies may be too small to confidently trust 
all existing relationships to be exposed. The longitudinal nature of the sample, rendering a multiple (5) of 
observations for each firm, may well introduce some statistical contamination, disguising other epiphanies, when 
addressing the complete sample of 5 years as one. It is arguably recommendable to address yearly data 
separately, using larger samples, subsequently imposing the longitudinal view. 
This study raises questions regarding the most common approach in applying legitimacy theory to voluntary CR 
disclosure research and proposes a different elaboration, using a legitimacy flowchart. The intended implication 
is that researchers will consider a similar approach in future research. Possibly, inconsistencies and contradictions 
in research findings may diminish by applying a more consistent and intrinsically proper interpretation and 
elaboration of legitimacy theory principles. Researchers may be able to find better ways to describe and explain 
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the realities of managerial decisions regarding corporate responsibility and accountability, from the legitimacy 
perspective. Executive managers should be aware of the growing corporate responsibility and accountability 
concerns, and understand the necessity of an appropriate legitimacy strategy, not limited to the instrumental 
alternative of just aiming at the perception of legitimacy. As the adherence to the traditional economic theories 
of shareholder value maximization lessens with a growing sense and recognition of corporate responsibilities and 
accountability, managers will understand the importance of a constructive legitimacy strategy, associated with 
truthful CR disclosure of appropriate quality. If not, disclosure legislation and even loss of autonomy may be the 
price to pay. This study has shown that progress in voluntary quantitative environmental disclosure is still 
modest. At this progress rate, it would take decades for all firms to adequately report their environmental 
performance. Instead of relying on voluntary CR disclosure, governmental encouragement (e.g. by regulation) 
may be necessary to enhance progress in quantitative environmental reporting to an acceptable level. At least 
with respect to the recently established EU climate agreements, progress has to be accomplished soon. 
Legitimacy theory deserves a significant role in research and theories regarding the behavior of organizations and 
their executive leaders. The application of the legitimacy theory can however certainly benefit from a more 
consistent and conceptually well considered elaboration, to improve its explanatory and prophetic value. Labeled 
as a positive theory, without a clear normative foundation, the legitimacy theory will be taken less seriously. The 
interests and concerns of society are arguably served by a clearly defined normative component as part of the 
legitimacy theory. This should subsequently be followed by an adequate and sensible operationalization to gain 
predictive value in empirical research, possibly reducing the inclination to discard the theory in favor of the 
traditional economic theory. Economic theory is undeniably indispensible, essential and useful in organizational 
research, but this indisputability does not extend to the fundamental tenet of shareholder value before corporate 
social responsibility. The collective conviction to adhere to this perspective at the expense of social 
responsibilities should be, and gradually appears to be relinquished, as predicted by Davis (1973). For theory to 
explain and describe this reality, the pyramid of corporate responsibilities (Carroll, 1991) should acknowledge 
ethical responsibilities as being of primary importance, perhaps even surpassing economical responsibilities. 
Labeling legitimacy theory as "just" a positive theory obviously demerits the importance of social responsibilities. 
And for ethical, social and environmental reporting to become a mature part of management accounting, 
comprehensive, mandatory disclosure requirements will have to be agreed upon, promoting verifiable 
quantitative reporting. As Adams (2004) states: "… Room for doubt as to whether reporting reflected performance 
… would not be tolerated in financial reporting". To eliminate this doubt, and to facilitate the valuation of a firm's 
performance on a societal scale, quantitative reporting is arguably required to be a part of accounting and audit 
practices. 
Obviously, an extensive amount of further research and theorizing efforts will be required to render a mature 
legitimacy theory elaboration and to provide integrated corporate reporting with a genuine conceptual 
integration of aspect reporting at accounting level. Hopefully this study has provided some thoughts and 
directions for future research efforts towards those ultimate objectives.  
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